



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

The Honorable Peter T. King
Chairman
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence
Committee on Homeland Security
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3202

JUN 14 2013

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to your letters dated June 5, 2013, to the Secretary of Defense and me, regarding a review you requested concerning alleged disclosures of classified information to the makers of the film *Zero Dark Thirty*. We have completed our review and a copy of the final report is enclosed.

The document that was posted on the Project on Government Oversight website was a copy of a pre-decisional working-draft of the report written by my staff in the Office of Intelligence and Special Programs Assessments. That working draft has not been issued and was not authorized to be released. As with any IG work product, the working draft has been edited and revised during a rigorous internal review process to produce the final report. Certain matters identified in conjunction with the review were referred to other DoD IG components and government agencies for analysis and action deemed appropriate.

No third parties, to include anyone from the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the Executive Office of the President, attempted to influence the content of the report or its release date. Communications with third parties related to content were limited to classification reviews by DoD Components to ensure proper marking and handling. As such, there is no documentation reflecting third party influence on the content or date of the report in response to your request for "all communications between DoD IG and any third parties." Our office conducted a thorough and impartial review consistent with our authority and independence under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. I strongly disagree with any assertion that the DoD IG has been "sitting on the report."

We have met with your staff on several occasions during the course of the review and provided answers to the questions that were posed in your letter dated August 9, 2011. We are available to brief you or your staff at your convenience. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me at (703) 604-8324.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Lynne M. Halbrooks", is positioned above the printed name.

Lynne M. Halbrooks
Principal Deputy

cc: The Honorable Brian Higgins
Ranking Member

Inspector General

United States
Department *of* Defense




OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL PROGRAM ASSESSMENTS

**Release of Department of Defense Information to
the Media**

Additional Information

The Department of Defense Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence and Special Program Assessments prepared this report. If you have questions, please contact the signer of the report.



Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADM	Admiral
ASD(PA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DASD(PA)	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
DCG	Deputy Commanding General
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDD	Department of Defense Directive
DoDI	Department of Defense Instruction
EOP	Executive Office of the President
GEN	General
OASD(PA)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
ODIG-ISPA	Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence and Special Program Assessments
OUSD(I)	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
OSR	Office of Security Review
PAO	Public Affairs Officer
RADM	Rear Admiral
TTPs	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
UBL	Usama bin Laden
U.S.C.	United States Code
USD(I)	Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command



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
MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC
AFFAIRS
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS
COMMAND
DIRECTOR, THE JOINT STAFF

SUBJECT: Congressionally Requested Action on Released Department of Defense
Information to the Media (Report No. DODIG-2013-092)

We are providing this report for your information and use. This report is in response to the House Committee on Homeland Security Chairman's letter dated August 9, 2011, addressed to the DoD Inspector General expressing "concern regarding ongoing leaks of classified information regarding sensitive military operations."

Specifically, the letter expressed concern that makers of a film about the operation leading to the death of Usama bin Laden received "top-level access to the most classified mission in history." The Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence and Special Program Assessments (ODIG-ISPA) conducted an inquiry of the concerns addressed in the letter. The results are provided herein.

Questions regarding this matter, please contact me at (703) 882-4860.


Anthony C. Thomas
Deputy Inspector General
for Intelligence and Special
Program Assessments

cc:

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Under Secretary Of Defense for Policy

Assistant to The Secretary Of Defense For Intelligence Oversight

**CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND SUBCOMMITTEES, CHAIRMAN
AND RANKING MINORITY MEMBER**

Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations

Senate Committee on Armed Services

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

House Committee on Armed Services

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

House Committee on Homeland Security

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

House Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign Operations,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

Introduction

Background

Congressional Request

In a letter dated August 9, 2011, the Honorable Peter King, Chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, cited concerns involving “ongoing leaks of classified information regarding sensitive military operations.” Chairman King referenced an August 6, 2011, *New York Times* op-ed column that claims, “Administration officials may have provided filmmakers with details of the raid that successfully killed Usama Bin Laden (UBL).” According to this article, filmmakers Kathryn Bigelow and Mark Boal received “top-level access to the most classified mission in history.” Chairman King requested that Department of Defense (DoD) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Inspectors General explore related matters and respond to the following questions:¹

- “What consultations, if any, occurred between members of the Executive Office of the President, and Department of Defense and/or CIA officials, regarding the advisability of providing Hollywood executives with access to covert military operators and clandestine CIA officers to discuss the UBL raid?”
- “Will a copy of this film be submitted to the military and CIA for pre-publication review, to determine if special operations tactics, techniques and procedures, or Agency intelligence sources and methods, would be revealed by its release?”
- “How was the attendance of filmmakers at a meeting with special operators and Agency officers at CIA Headquarters balanced against those officers’ duties to maintain their covers? How will cover concerns be addressed going forward?”
- “What steps did the Administration take to ensure that no special operations tactics, techniques, and procedures were compromised during those meetings?”

¹ Our project did not address a fifth question that pertains exclusively to the CIA: “To the extent possible to determine, how many human intelligence sources and how many Agency intelligence methods have been compromised due to leaks about the May 1st raid? What effects have these compromises had on the CIA’s collection capabilities? Will Agency participation in a film about the bin Laden raid add to or exacerbate the effects of these compromises?”

Filmmakers' Interest in the UBL Raid

On May 1, 2011, the President of the United States of America announced that the United States conducted an operation that resulted in UBL's death. On May 2, 2011, senior administration officials held a press briefing. That same day, Mr. Boal contacted DoD officials concerning a film he was producing that focused on the Government's efforts to track UBL. The prospective film chronicled UBL's escape in Tora Bora, Afghanistan. Subsequent to the White House's announcement, the filmmakers decided to revise their project's scope and sought additional information from DoD and CIA regarding the UBL raid.

Scope & Methodology

This report responds to specific questions posed by Chairman King. In conducting this project, we focused exclusively on DoD equities and interests. Additionally, we reviewed applicable laws, regulations, DoD Directives and Instructions; reviewed and analyzed numerous documents and emails obtained from DoD components; and interviewed² numerous personnel from DoD components.

Certain matters identified in conjunction with our review were referred to other DoD IG components and/or government agencies for analysis and action deemed appropriate. Information related to these referrals has been excluded from this report to avoid the possibility of materially prejudicing on-going reviews and investigations.

We have initiated a follow-on review that will address various policy and procedural matters identified throughout the course of this inquiry, to include DoD interaction with media when the subject concerns DoD sensitive and/or classified information or programs. The results of our follow-on review will be documented via a second report.

Criteria

DoD Instruction 5410.16, "DoD Assistance to Non-Government, Entertainment-Oriented Motion Picture, Television, and Video Productions," dated January 26, 1988, provides guidelines regarding entertainment-oriented productions that seek Department assistance when producing films or documentaries.

DoD Instruction 5230.29 "Security and Policy Review of DoD Information for Public Release," dated January 8, 2009, references a security classification review process designed to ensure officially-released information is not classified.

DoD Instruction 5410.16 states, "Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD(PA)) is the sole authority for approving DoD assistance to non-Government motion picture, television, and video productions."

² Interviews are referenced throughout this report as testimony. Interviews were not conducted under oath.

DoD Instruction 5410.16 identifies that non-Government motion picture, television, and video productions receive official DoD support “when cooperation of the producers with the Government results in benefitting the Department of Defense or when this would be in the best national interest, based on consideration of the following factors:

- The production must be authentic in its portrayal of actual persons, places, military operations, and historical events. Fictional portrayals must depict a feasible interpretation of military life, operations, and policies.
- The production is of informational value and considered to be in the best interest of public understanding of the U.S. Armed Forces and DoD.
- The production may provide services to the general public relating to, or enhancing, the U.S. Armed Forces recruiting and retention programs.
- The production should not appear to condone or endorse activities by private citizens or organizations when such activities are contrary to U.S. Government policy.”

Prior to ASD(PA) receiving an official request for support, DoD Components are authorized to assist non-Government producers or scriptwriters in their efforts to develop a script that might ultimately qualify for DoD assistance. Authorized activities prior to the official request for support include providing guidance, suggestions, or access for purposes of technical research. DoD components providing such assistance are required to coordinate with Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OASD(PA)).

According to DoD Instruction 5410.16, official requests for support require production companies to submit copies of their script for ASD(PA) review and approval. DoD supported productions are required to arrange for an official DoD screening prior to public release. Preferably, this review should take place before composite printing to ensure ample time is available to make necessary changes.

DoD Instruction 5230.29 requires Washington Headquarters Services’ Office of Security Review (OSR) to conduct a classification and policy review of DoD information to be released publicly. While not specifically required, production scripts could be reviewed by OSR.

INQUIRY RESULTS

Question 1: “What consultations, if any, occurred between members of the Executive Office of the President and the Department of Defense ... regarding the advisability of providing Hollywood executives with access to covert military operators . . . to discuss the UBL raid?”

Summary:

Our review did not identify consultations between DoD personnel and representatives from the Executive Office of the President (EOP) regarding the advisability of providing filmmakers with access to military special operators. The EOP, however, did communicate with the DoD regarding providing the filmmakers interviews with Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) Michael G. Vickers. We identified internal DoD communications in which various Department representatives discussed the extent to which DoD should support the filmmakers. DoD representatives also discussed whether the filmmakers should be provided access to military special operators. It was ultimately determined that a special operations planner would speak to filmmakers on background. Our review revealed attempts to set up a meeting between the planner and filmmakers; however, based on information obtained, no meeting took place.

Discussion:

The following timeline summarizes relevant interactions between DoD officials, EOP staff, and filmmakers:

On May 2, 2011, Mr. Boal emailed Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (DASD(PA)) Geoff Morrell. Mr. Boal requested contact information for United States Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM’s) public affairs officer (PAO). A representative from the Glover Park Group³ of Washington, D.C., was courtesy copied.

On May 3, 2011, Ms. Bigelow contacted a representative from the OASD(PA) regarding the Wounded Warrior Project.⁴ Ms. Bigelow mentioned that she would be traveling to Washington, D.C. in late May and suggested they meet.

On May 23, 2011, Mr. Boal emailed Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD(PA)) Douglas Wilson and DASD(PA) Morrell. Mr. Boal thanked ASD(PA) Wilson and DASD(PA) Morrell for arranging a May 19, 2011, meeting between the filmmakers and government representatives. Mr. Boal indicated that the government

³ According to its website, Glover Park Group is a strategic communications firm. The website states, “GPG was built to help organizations navigate this shifting landscape. We combine substantive understanding of complex issues with disciplined execution of crisp influence campaigns that shape the way critical audiences view our clients and their goals.”

⁴ The Wounded Warrior Project was established to raise awareness and enlist the public’s aid for the needs of injured service members.

representatives suggested filmmakers speak with USD(I) Vickers and Rear Admiral (RADM) Dennis Moynihan, former Chief of Information, U.S. Navy. It was also suggested that the filmmakers should contact the USSOCOM PAO. In this email, Mr. Boal states that ASD(PA) Wilson had previously offered to contact Admiral (ADM) Eric T. Olson, former Commander of USSOCOM, to “check on his willingness to talk after he leaves the military,” and to introduce Mr. Boal to journalists Mr. Mark Ambinder and Ms. Kim Dozier.

On May 25, 2011, ASD(PA) Wilson sent an email to his assistant and agreed to personally call Ms. Dozier and Mr. Ambinder to help Mr. Boal, but that he was going to hold off connecting Mr. Boal with USD(I) Vickers and ADM Olson.

On June 5, 2011, Mr. Boal emailed DASD(PA) Morrell. Mr. Boal wrote that he recently saw General (GEN) Peter W. Chiarelli, former U.S. Army Vice Chief of Staff, at dinner, GEN Chiarelli reportedly suggested that Mr. Boal meet with USD(I) Vickers. Later that evening, Mr. Boal sent another email to DASD(PA) Morrell and requested an interview with USD(I) Vickers to discuss the scope of the prospective film.

On June 9, 2011, Mr. Boal met with USD(I) Vickers in his Pentagon office. Mr. Boal provided USD(I) Vickers a background brief on his movie project, the timeline of the project, and possible project scope. An OASD(PA) desk officer summarized this meeting in an email to individuals in the EOP,⁵ the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), CIA, USSOCOM, and OASD(PA). The summary noted that Mr. Boal had not yet requested formal DoD support.

On June 9, 2011, Mr. Boal emailed ASD(PA) Wilson and thanked him for sponsoring the meeting with USD(I) Vickers.

On June 10, 2011, ADM Olson forwarded an email to USD(I) Vickers that he [ADM Olson] received from USSOCOM’s PAO. The USSOCOM PAO indicated that the DoD Director of Entertainment Media was not inclined to support Mr. Boal and Ms. Bigelow’s project.⁶

On June 10, 2011, USD(I) Vickers contacted ADM William H. McRaven, current USSOCOM Commander, regarding DoD interest in supporting the UBL movie. ADM McRaven told USD(I) Vickers that he did not want to be involved in the project given his impending assignment as USSOCOM commander; however, if DoD offered

⁵ According to the OASD(PA) desk officer, the White House National Security Staff always provides guidance on projects involving interagency coordination; thus, this meeting summary was distributed to those individuals for interagency coordination.

⁶ DoD’s Director of Entertainment Media informed us that he was not pleased with the way the military was portrayed in Mr. Boal and Ms. Bigelow’s film, “Hurt Locker” and he was not eager to deal with the filmmakers; however, he was willing to review a script. The director stated, “No, I would not have recommended [a meeting with USD(I) Vickers]. If SOCOM had said, ‘We are not interested in this picture at all,’ then there wouldn’t be any point in having any meetings.” The statement was preceded by, “I wasn’t given the choice of whether to authorize it or not. I mean, these senior people do whatever they want.”

formal support for the project, he may be able to identify a special operations planner who could provide background information.

On June 13, 2011, USD(I) Vickers sent an email to ASD(PA) Wilson. USD(I) Vickers stated that he had contacted Deputy Director of the CIA Michael Morrell on June 10, 2011. USD(I) Vickers stated, "at the direction of Director Panetta, CIA is cooperating fully" and that "several CIA staff have talked to Mark [Boal], for the intelligence case, they are basically using the White House-approved talking points used the night of the operation." In response, ASD(PA) Wilson wrote, "[W]e need to be careful here so we don't open the media floodgates on this. I'm going to check with WH to update them on status, and will report back."

On June 14, 2011, Mr. Boal sent an email to the OASD(PA) desk officer. Mr. Boal inquired about the possibility of additional meetings with USD(I) Vickers. Mr. Boal mentioned that he was also coordinating with the White House, but he did not identify a point of contact.

On June 14, 2011, ASD(PA) Wilson sent an email to Mr. Boal in which he stated, "If you have any problems with [the DoD's Director of Entertainment Media] on any of this, come to me."⁷ In a separate email on that same day, ASD(PA) Wilson informed the OASD(PA) desk officer that he approved a second meeting between USD(I) Vickers and Mr. Boal, but was awaiting additional guidance from the White House.⁸

On June 15, 2011, ASD(PA) Wilson emailed Mr. Boal and inquired about his travel schedule. ASD(PA) Wilson indicated that he wanted to escort Mr. Boal to the White House. In response, Mr. Boal informed ASD(PA) Wilson he would be in Washington, D.C., from June 20 through June 21, and June 27 through July 1.

On June 15, 2011, a member of the White House National Security Staff, the White House Deputy Press Secretary, as well as ASD(PA) Wilson exchanged multiple emails in which ASD(PA) Wilson coordinated a meeting between Mr. Boal and the White House.

On June 20, 2011, the DoD Director of Entertainment Media emailed a summary of a conversation he had with Mr. Boal, to personnel within the OASD(PA), which eventually reached ASD(PA) Wilson.

"I just heard from Mark Boal. He explained what had already been in the trade press, that he'd been working on a

⁷ ASD(PA) Wilson testified that "[Mr. Boal and Ms. Bigelow's] previous experience with the [DoD Director of Entertainment Media] had been mixed and I wanted [Mr. Boal and Ms. Bigelow] to know, look, you know, if you're -- if you're having problems getting answers or things like that, let me know and, you know, we're not going to put walls up here."

⁸ In testimony, ASD(PA) Wilson stated, "The guidance from the White House is how do you deal with these people. In terms of the content of what is told to them, that's Vickers. You would have to ask Vickers and the people who actually talked to them about the events."

Tora Bora script when the Bin Laden operation took place, and now they've switched to that story. He mentioned the interviews here and at CIA, and hoped I would be in on these (at least at DoD) in the future. He said he hoped to complete the script this summer, and was still wondering about potential filming locations. The picture is expected to have a 4th quarter 2012 release. They are financing independently with Sony doing the distribution. He agreed to keep me up to date with his research efforts. Of course at some point he hopes to interview SEALs, and whether ADM Olson would be amenable to this kind of research remains to be seen.”

On June 21, 2011, ASD(PA) Wilson responded to the DoD's Director of Entertainment Media email on June 20, 2011 with, “excellent, many thanks. What's your take on this? In my brief encounters with him so far, it sounds solid. FYI, Director Panetta has been very supportive of this over at CIA...” On the same day, the DoD Director of Entertainment responded to ASD(PA) Wilson, writing:

“Well, we had a good conversation -- about the script, the research, and some logistical and geographical considerations, and you know that we tend to withhold judgment until reading a shooting script and attempting negotiations. But with all the special forces-oriented projects there's the problem of persuading the community to provide enough information and production support to convey our version of events with some realism, while avoiding the disclosure of things we don't want out there... Usually, SOCOM's response is "We're not going to get involved at all.””

In a June 21, 2011, email, DoD's Director of Entertainment Media wrote to the USSOCOM PAO and OASD(PA) representatives that Mr. Boal hoped to “interview SEALs, and whether SOCOM would be amenable to this kind of research remains to be seen.”

On June 21, 2011, the USSOCOM PAO sent an email to the DoD Director of Entertainment Media and the OASD(PA) desk officer, stating that USSOCOM's position was “that there was already too much information released concerning the bin Laden raid and has obvious concerns about DoD providing any support for this effort.” Another

OASD(PA) desk officer responded to this email by arranging a meeting with the USSOCOM PAO set to take place on June 24, 2011 to discuss the UBL movie.⁹

On June 22, 2011, an internal OASD(PA) communication references a meeting to be scheduled at the White House between ASD(PA) Wilson and the White House Deputy Press Secretary. ASD(PA) Wilson writes, "We've got the green light to proceed" and "the White House does want to engage with Mark [Mr. Boal] but it probably won't be for a few more weeks."

On June 27, 2011, a member of the National Security Staff sent an email to an OUSD(I) representative. According to the National Security Staff member, Mr. Boal would contact OUSD(I) and request an interview with USD(I) Vickers. Additionally, on this day, an OASD(PA) desk officer contacted Mr. Boal to find a day for Mr. Boal to interview USD(I) Vickers.

On July 7, 2011, Mr. Boal emailed the OASD(PA) desk officer to identify the dates he would be in Washington, D.C. The meeting logistics were coordinated in later e-mails between a Glover Park Group representative and the OASD(PA) Desk Officer. This included the question by the Glover Park Group representative, "Are you the appropriate person to give their security clearance information to? I also have the information for the car and driver that will be bringing them to the Pentagon and assume I need to provide that as well."¹⁰

On July 12, 2011, Mr. Boal emailed ASD(PA) Wilson to arrange a meeting on July 19, 2011. The stated purpose was to update ASD(PA) Wilson on the status of the film and additionally set-up a separate time to meet for a drink.

On July 13, 2011, ASD(PA) Wilson sent a calendar invite to Mr. Boal and Ms. Bigelow in response to Mr. Boal's July 12, 2011 email. ASD(PA) Wilson additionally wrote to Mr. Boal, "Jeremy Bash [Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense] and I talked yesterday, and he and I will work to unclog the SOCOM pathway for you."¹¹

⁹ The USSOCOM PAO testified, he met with the DoD Director of Entertainment Media. This meeting was attended by the USSOCOM PAO and personnel from the OASD(PA). The USSOCOM PAO stated his general response about supporting the project was, "well you can send me something formally, and I can send you something back formally. But we're not touching this." The USSOCOM PAO further testified, "[The DoD Director of Entertainment Media] was strongly against [the movie]."

¹⁰ According to a representative of the OUSD(I), this reference is in regards to their parking clearance information and Pentagon security.

¹¹ Mr. Bash testified that he did not remember a specific conversation with ASD(PA) Wilson while at the DoD, but that "it is likely [he] caught [ASD(PA) Wilson] in the hallway and said something like, [he] talked to those guys and they are serious about portraying the matter accurately, not revealing anything inappropriate or sensitive." According to ASD(PA) Wilson, while Mr. Bash was at CIA, Mr. Boal complained to Mr. Bash that "SOCOM wasn't being as forthcoming as they wanted." Mr. Bash testified that while at DoD he could recall only one meeting with the filmmakers and it was, "to hear about what their ideas were."

Ms. Bigelow responded to ASD(PA) Wilson's calendar invite to express gratitude. ASD(PA) Wilson responded to Ms. Bigelow's email writing, "I've talked to Jeremy [Bash] and to Mike Vickers and we want to make the path easier for you here with the SOCOM folks, so I'm hoping to have an update on that for you."¹²

On July 14, 2011, USD(I) Vickers and ADM Olson exchanged emails, which included the following statements:

USD(I) Vickers: "Doug Wilson (ASD PA) told me yesterday that Secy Panetta wants the Department to cooperate fully with the makers of the UBL movie. Last time we talked, you and [ADM McRaven] had agreed to allow [the special operations planner's initials] to represent you on background. SOF participation would be limited to that. Is that still the case? I have to meet with the producer and director tomorrow and want to know what [to] say."

ADM Olson: "Yes, this is still the case. On background is key. His main task is to provide accuracy and context where needed. My (our) hope and intent is that [the special operations planner's initials] not be identified by name as having participated in any way."

On July 15, 2011, USD(I) Vickers, the DoD Director of Entertainment Media and an OASD(PA) desk officer met with Ms. Bigelow and Mr. Boal at the Pentagon. The OASD(PA) desk officer recorded and transcribed this interview.

On July 16, 2011, Mr. Boal emailed the OASD(PA) desk officer in an attempt to obtain access to the special operations planner. Additionally on July 16, 2011, USD(I) Vickers and ASD(PA) Wilson engaged in an email conversation in which USD(I) Vickers stated:

"Had a very good meeting with Mark Boal and Kathryn Bigelow last night re: UBL movie. Think they came away very happy. Putting them in touch with VADM M's key planner, which should complete for now their requests of DoD."

¹² USD(I) Vickers testified "one of [Mr. Boal's] requests is to meet with various SOCOM people and I know certainly being with operators was going to be dead on arrival, but I told him that I would check with the commanders and see what if anything, I'm not making you any promises."

Our review revealed attempts to set up a meeting between the planner and filmmakers; however, based on information obtained, no meeting took place.

On July 20, 2011, ASD(PA) Wilson emailed Mr. Boal and Ms. Bigelow and stated:

“Great to see you last night, and sorry I had to bolt at the end. Copying [Pentagon Press Secretary] George Little,¹³ he will facilitate your visit to the Virginia facility¹⁴ we discussed, it looks like that can happen. Thanks so much for the hospitality, and we all look forward to seeing you again and to working with you.”

On July 20, 2011, in a separate email Mr. Boal thanked Mr. Little “for pulling for [him and Ms. Bigelow] at the agency. It made all the difference.” Mr. Little responded by telling Mr. Boal that DoD and CIA “are excited about the project. It’s been a real pleasure to help facilitate things.” As a postscript, Mr. Little wrote, “I want you to note how good I’ve been about not mentioning the premiere tickets. :-).”¹⁵

On July 23, 2011, the special operations planner emailed the OUSD(I) representative. The planner indicated that he had spoken to ADM McRaven about the project.

On August 17, 2011, the special operations planner emailed the OASD(PA) desk officer. The planner informed the desk officer that he had spoken to USD(I) Vickers. The planner expressed a desire to meet with the desk officer prior to meeting with filmmakers. The desk officer responded, “I think we have a little time.” The desk officer commented on press stories that suggested the White House, DoD and CIA provided special access and classified information to the filmmakers. The desk officer denied that this had occurred, and stated, “We may want to let the dust settle a little.”¹⁶

¹³ Mr. Little joined the Department in July 2011 as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs and took on the duties of ASD(PA) when ASD(PA) Wilson left the DoD. Prior to that, Mr. Little was Director of Public Affairs at the CIA.

¹⁴ Mr. Little testified he thought the Virginia facility was a location of a DoD unit. We contacted that facility and confirmed neither Mr. Boal nor Ms. Bigelow visited the facility.

¹⁵ Mr. Little testified this reference was “a joke that [he has] made with plenty of entertainment producers” and that he has never received anything from Mr. Boal or Ms. Bigelow.

¹⁶ The Honorable Chairman Peter King’s letter to the DoD and CIA IG’s was dated August 9, 2011.

Question 2: “Will a copy of this film be submitted to the military . . . for pre-publication review, to determine if special operations tactics, techniques and procedures . . . would be revealed by its release?”

Summary:

DoD officials informed us they did not expect filmmakers to offer DoD the opportunity to engage in a pre-release review of the film script. The Department does not require non-government, entertainment-oriented motion picture, television, and video productions (“productions”) to submit scripts or films for review unless the production company formally requested DoD support. According to these officials, Mr. Boal and Ms. Bigelow never formally requested DoD support.

Discussion

During an interview, ASD(PA) Wilson confirmed that his office is the focal point for interaction with the entertainment industry.¹⁷ He also told us that his office is “pretty open to just about anybody who wants to come and ask about research for a project.” He explained the difference between research and support:

“So people can and do come here to ask for assistance in their initial research phase of the project and, by and large, we’re very open and helpful to them. Depending on what the topic is, it can involve -- can be limited to our office. It can -- more often, it’s beyond our office, involving other offices, and sometimes it involves other agencies.

* * *

There is a difference between the research phase and the actual support phase and I’ll give you an example. *The Hurt Locker*, which was directed by Kathryn Bigelow ...her partner Mark Boal, came to the Department in the research phase of [*The Hurt Locker*] and so they did that... but I believe they began initially in the support phase, as well. They -- they were going to support, but they reached a point in the script and in the filming where... the Department felt they could no longer support the film, you know, as an official Department entity, so they did not. So there is a difference between the two phases.”

¹⁷ DoD Instruction 5410.16 states, “ASD(PA) is the sole authority for approving DoD assistance to non-Government motion picture, television, and video productions.”

As previously identified only official requests for support require production companies to submit copies of their script for ASD(PA) review and approval. During post-production, the production company must arrange for an official DoD screening prior to public release.

Additionally, DoD's Director of Entertainment Media testified that DoD involvement in the research and/or development phase of a production does not necessarily prompt a classification review.

On October 20, 2011, multiple emails that indicated phone calls were exchanged between ASD(PA) Wilson, DoD's Director of Entertainment Media and Mr. Boal. These conversations were concerning the review of a script; however, DoD's Director of Entertainment Media informed us he never received a script. On February 21, 2012, the DoD Director of Entertainment Media contacted Mr. Boal regarding the project, but Mr. Boal said he was not shooting yet.

Question 3: "How was the attendance of filmmakers at a meeting with special operators and Agency officers at CIA Headquarters balanced against those officers' duties to maintain their covers? How will cover concerns be addressed going forward?"

Summary

Our review revealed that DoD special operators attended a June 24, 2011, CIA Headquarters awards ceremony that recognized individuals involved in the UBL raid. We were informed that the special operators present at the ceremony were not in a cover status. According to testimony from ADM McRaven, Mr. Boal attended this event. We were unable to identify any precautionary measures that were taken to protect the identity of operators that attended this event. This is the only event we identified that was attended by special operators and either of the filmmakers.

Discussion

According to DoD Directive S-5105.61, "DoD Cover and Cover Support Activities," dated May 6, 2010, cover is a protective guise used by a person, organization, or installation to conceal true affiliation with clandestine or other sensitive activities. DoD cover may be used to protect the Department of Defense, its intelligence sources and methods, and its clandestine tactics, techniques, and procedures, from exposure to the enemy and overt association with sensitive activities.

According to testimony from senior officials, Mr. Boal was present at a CIA Headquarters awards ceremony. Special operators involved with the UBL raid also attended this awards ceremony. We were told by the special operators' chain of command that the special operators were not in cover status at the time of this event. However, ADM McRaven and the former USSOCOM Chief of Staff informed us that the

protection of names of the special operators associated with the UBL mission was a top priority.

CIA Headquarters Awards Ceremony

On June 24, 2011, the CIA held an awards ceremony at CIA Headquarters, Langley, VA. Two to four days prior to this awards ceremony, a CIA PAO contacted a DoD PAO and notified him that a filmmaker (later identified as Mr. Boal) might attend the event. According to the DoD PAO, the CIA PAO hoped to prevent Mr. Boal from attending. The DoD PAO did not inform his superiors or the special operators who were scheduled to attend the ceremony that a filmmaker might attend. The DoD PAO indicated that he did not forward this information to his commander because he hoped that the CIA PAO would be able to prohibit the filmmaker from attending.

According to the DoD PAO, the day of the event, the CIA PAO contacted him and indicated that it had been determined that the filmmaker would be allowed to attend the event. The DoD PAO was unable to communicate this fact to DoD personnel attending the ceremony.

According to the Deputy Commanding General (DCG) of the relevant combatant command, special operators believed that only a few individuals would attend the event; however, our review determined that the event was heavily attended. The DCG also told us, special operators “were actually in uniform, with nametapes, because it was a formal ceremony. [They] were in the front row, front, left side, prominently on display for everybody.”

One senior official who attended the event described it as “a huge enormous crowd, I mean they built a tent and it was not a sensitive, I would say it was not a highly sensitive event. It was pretty much a cattle call for a lot of folks and for around the community and obviously not open to the public per se.” We also determined that the event was broadcast on CIA’s closed circuit television and a video depicting the event was accessible via the CIA’s classified network.

ADM McRaven testified that at the end of the ceremony, “somebody brought somebody up to me and said this is Mr. so-in-so he’s the same guy who did the *Hurt Locker* and of course I was admittedly a little surprised.” The DCG of the relevant combatant command testified that when he and his subordinates were told the producers of the “*Hurt Locker*” were present they, “all tried, you know, to get as much distance as possible, to include ADM McRaven. Um, this was the first time he was made aware of it as well and he was pretty, he was visibly, surprised and shocked.”

Force Protection and Operation Security Support

During this inquiry, ADM McRaven referenced concerns regarding the possible release of names of personnel associated with the UBL operation.

According to ADM McRaven, DoD provided the operators and their families an inordinate level of security. ADM McRaven stated that he previously met with operators' family members and discussed force protection measures. USSOCOM officials informed family members that protective monitoring will be initiated, and instructed them to call security personnel if security-related incidents arise. ADM McRaven also directed personnel to forego releasing names of operators and photographs associated with the raid.

Additionally, our review identified other Department actions conducted to support operational security concerns identified above and further protect the unit that conducted the raid.

Question 4: “What steps did the Administration take to ensure that no special operations tactics, techniques, and procedures were compromised during those meetings?”

Within the DoD, we did not identify instances whereby any special operations tactics, techniques, and procedures-related information was provided to filmmakers. ADM McRaven informed us, to protect sensitive information, “if the decision was made to support the film, then [SOCOM] would provide some technical advice as long as it didn't compromise any sensitive techniques.”



Inspector General Department of Defense

SECRET**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY****Office of Inspector General**

(U) REPORT OF AUDIT

(U) CIA Processes for Engaging With the Entertainment Industry

Report No. 2012-0013-AS

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

31 December 2012
Issue Date

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(U) Report of Audit
(U) CIA Processes for Engaging
With the Entertainment Industry

(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) The objectives of this audit were to determine whether CIA processes for engaging with the entertainment industry are:

- Designed to support consistency and fairness in handling access requests.
- Designed to adequately protect classified and sensitive information.
- Effective in achieving the goals established by the Office of Public Affairs (OPA) for activities within the entertainment industry.
- In compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

(U//~~FOUO~~) We found that records maintained by OPA are not sufficient to document that entertainment industry requests to CIA for briefings, interviews, visits, and other support are handled in a consistent and fair manner and that engagement with the entertainment industry is effective in furthering CIA's goal for engagement. OPA has not maintained a comprehensive list of entertainment projects that the CIA has supported and those projects that CIA has declined to support. OPA and other CIA employees have not always complied with Agency regulations intended to prevent the release of classified information during their interactions with entertainment industry representatives. This report recommends that the Director of Public Affairs (Director, OPA) implement a central recordkeeping capability for entertainment industry requests to CIA for briefings, interviews, visits, and other support. The report also recommends that the Director, OPA issue guidance on contact with the entertainment industry and support to entertainment industry projects to help ensure that current and former CIA employees comply with CIA security requirements in their interactions with the entertainment industry.

(U//~~FOUO~~) CIA has not been reimbursed for costs incurred in supporting entertainment industry projects and has cited authority under section 8 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 to incur such costs without reimbursement. We believe this to be a questionable use of section 8 authority. This report recommends that the Director, OPA, in coordination with the General Counsel, establish a documented policy for determining when fees should be charged by CIA in providing support to entertainment industry projects and how those fees are collected.

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Assistant Inspector General for Audit

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SECRET**(U) BACKGROUND**

(U//~~FOUO~~) The CIA is a frequent subject of entertainment industry projects, such as books, television programs, documentaries, and motion pictures. CIA officials work with entertainment industry professionals—directors, producers, screenwriters, authors, documentarians, and actors—to debunk myths about CIA and intelligence work, present a balanced and accurate image of the CIA, and lend authenticity to entertainment industry projects. According to the CIA public website, CIA's goal in engaging with the entertainment industry is to ensure "an accurate portrayal of the men and women of the CIA, and the skill, innovation, daring, and commitment to public service that defines them." CIA officials have provided advice on improving the context and accuracy of scripts, provided tours of the CIA, and overseen production on CIA property. A CIA official directly involved in supporting entertainment industry projects told us that the CIA receives requests from five to seven, small-scale projects each week; many of these requests are limited to questions about CIA culture or historical events. Since October 2011, the CIA has received about three or four requests for support to large-scale entertainment projects—projects that would require a greater commitment of CIA resources to support. CIA officials directly involved in supporting entertainment industry projects told us that, since 11 September 2001, there has been only one major motion picture that has been allowed to film at CIA Headquarters.¹

(U) The CIA, Office of Public Affairs (OPA) is responsible for facilitating effective internal and external communications for CIA and is the focal point for CIA engagement with the entertainment industry. OPA comprises three branches: Media Relations, Public Communications, and Internal Communications. The OPA (b)(3) CIAAct Liaison is responsible for CIA engagement with the entertainment industry.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) OPA officials told us that they follow the provisions of Agency Regulation (AR) 6-1, *Media Briefings and Release of Unclassified Information to News Media*, when engaging with the entertainment industry.² AR 6-1 assigns OPA responsibility for responding to requests for briefings, interviews, and visits from the media and for arranging and monitoring responses. AR 6-1 prescribes that OPA will not discriminate among members of the media in granting requests. A decision on whether or not to provide a briefing, interview,

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² (U//~~FOUO~~) AR 10-5, *Reporting Requirements for Unofficial or Unintended Contact With the Media*, defines "media" as any means of mass public communications to include: newspapers; magazines; periodicals and books; radio and television; electronic or on-line publications and communications, including blogs and wikis; and entertainment organizations; or persons such as reporters, commentators, columnists, journalists, editors, photographers, academic researchers, authors, filmmakers, documentary producers, television producers, and other members of public information organizations or the entertainment industry.

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or visit is to be based on the merits of the request, the sensitivity of the subject matter, the media representative's record of abiding by CIA direction concerning any classified information that is inadvertently disclosed, and the availability of appropriate CIA personnel. Each briefing, interview, or visit must be approved in advance by the Director of Public Affairs (D/OPA) and the directorate involved. CIA officials have stated that the protection of national security equities is paramount in determining whether and how the CIA engages with the entertainment industry.

(U//~~FOUO~~) AR 6-1 prescribes that briefings to the media normally will be conducted in the offices of OPA or another designated area, and an OPA representative will be present during briefings. OPA is responsible for advising current and, when requested, former CIA employees on their contacts with media representatives; maintaining a central record of all CIA contacts with media representatives, by both OPA and other components; and providing the Center for CIA Security (now the Office of Security) copies of all reports of contacts with the media. AR 6-1 requires CIA employees, except as authorized by the Director, CIA; Deputy Director, CIA; EXDIR (Associate Deputy Director, CIA); or the Director, OPA, to refer all inquiries, whether official or unofficial, from media representatives to OPA and engage in no contact on behalf of the CIA with media representatives.

(U) AUDIT RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**(U) OPA Has Not Maintained Adequate Records of CIA Engagement With the Entertainment Industry**

(U//~~FOUO~~) Records maintained by OPA are not sufficient to document that entertainment industry requests to CIA for briefings, interviews, visits, and other support are handled in a consistent and fair manner, that engagement with the entertainment industry is effective in furthering CIA's goal for engagement, and that classified information is protected when the CIA engages with the entertainment industry. OPA has not maintained a comprehensive list of entertainment projects that the CIA has supported and those projects that CIA has declined to support. Although AR 6-1 does not specify the information to be maintained in a central record of contacts with representatives of the media, the record should include information sufficient to document that the CIA has acted in compliance with AR 6-1. Maintenance of adequate records is an important control in providing assurance that CIA procedures for engaging with the entertainment industry are effective and that CIA officers comply with applicable regulations and guidance.

(U//~~FOUO~~) In 2011, OPA officials prepared a list of 22 entertainment industry projects that obtained support from CIA. The list included books, television programs, documentaries, and motion pictures. We reviewed a sample of eight projects—two books, two television programs, two documentaries, and two motion pictures—that were in production or completed between January 2006 and the start of our audit in April 2012 to assess compliance with CIA procedures

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for engaging with the entertainment industry. The eight entertainment industry projects are identified in Figure 2.

Figure 2 is UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Entertainment Projects Reviewed

Title	Year Published
Books	
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<i>The Devil's Light</i> by Richard North Patterson	2011
Television Programs	
<i>Top Chef-Covert Cuisine</i> episode	2010
<i>Covert Affairs</i>	2010-Present
Documentaries	
<i>Air America: The CIA's Secret Airline</i> broadcast by History	2008
<i>The Secret War on Terror</i> broadcast by the British Broadcasting Corporation	2011
Motion Pictures	
<i>Argo</i>	In Production ⁴
<i>Zero Dark Thirty</i>	In Production ⁵

(U) Source: OIG team-generated from information provided by OPA.

(U//~~FOUO~~) OPA was unable to provide documentation concerning the nature and extent of CIA's support to three of the eight projects: *The Devil's Light*; *Air America: The CIA's Secret Airline*; and *The Secret War on Terror*. OPA provided limited documentation concerning CIA support to the other five projects. For only one of the eight projects was OPA able to provide a complete list of the current and former CIA employees—the briefers, interviewees, guides, security escorts—who had been in contact with entertainment industry representatives in the course of CIA support to the project.

(U) Assessments of Entertainment Industry Requests Were Not Documented

(U//~~FOUO~~) We were unable to determine whether entertainment industry requests for support were handled in a consistent and fair manner. OPA does not maintain records of entertainment industry requests for briefings, interviews, and visits that are denied by CIA. As such, it was not possible to assess decisions to deny CIA support for compliance with AR 6-1. Regarding those entertainment industry requests that were supported by CIA, there was not sufficient documentation to assess the decision and the nature and extent of the support for compliance with AR 6-1.

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⁴ (U) *Argo* was released on 31 August 2012, after we completed our audit fieldwork.

⁵ (U) *Zero Dark Thirty* was released on 19 December 2012, after we completed our audit fieldwork.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Based on the limited documentation available from OPA, CIA support and involvement in entertainment industry projects appear to have varied considerably from one project to another. For example, we noted that the CIA provided significantly more support to one of the eight entertainment industry projects that we reviewed: *Zero Dark Thirty*. Entertainment industry representatives for this project met with ☐ CIA officers (the majority of whom were under cover), in some instances for several hours and on multiple occasions, including meeting with one officer approximately 12 times. For the four other projects in our sample for which there was some documentation concerning CIA support, it appears that CIA provided entertainment industry representatives only one or two meetings with overt CIA officers for each project. However, because of the lack of sufficient documentation, it was not possible for us to determine that *Zero Dark Thirty* was deserving of greater CIA support based on the "merits" of the project and the application of the other criteria for assessing media requests prescribed in AR 6-1 or that *Zero Dark Thirty* had been deemed to have greater potential for furthering the CIA's goal for interacting with the entertainment industry.

**(U//~~FOUO~~) OPA Lacks Procedures
to Measure the Impact of Engagement
With the Entertainment Industry**

(U//~~FOUO~~) OPA lacks a systematic process to assess and document the effectiveness of CIA's engagement with the entertainment industry. OPA officials stated that although they do not have procedures to document the impact of CIA's support to entertainment industry projects, OPA officers' substantial involvement in the projects and, in most cases, the involvement of senior CIA officials ensure that projects further CIA's goal to ensure "an accurate portrayal of the men and women of the CIA, and the skill, innovation, daring, and commitment to public service that defines them." Based on our review of the six completed projects in our sample, the projects portrayed CIA in a manner generally consistent with CIA's goal. We were unable to determine whether the remaining two projects, the motion pictures, met CIA's goal because they were in production at the time of the audit. Based on our interviews with individuals involved in the projects and our review of records provided by OPA, we found nothing to suggest that the projects' results would be inconsistent with CIA's goal. However, formal procedures for assessing and documenting the extent to which CIA support to individual projects furthered CIA's goal could be useful in making decisions concerning continued CIA support to particular media projects or individual persons or entities in the entertainment industry.

**(U) Deviations From Agency Regulations
Raise Security Concerns**

(U//~~FOUO~~) OPA and other CIA employees did not always comply with Agency regulations intended to prevent the release of classified information during their interactions with entertainment industry representatives. OPA did not report contacts

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between CIA employees and media representatives to the Office of Security as required by AR 6-1 for any of the eight projects we reviewed. CIA officers from components other than OPA were interviewed by entertainment industry representatives on at least four of the five projects we reviewed for which there was some record of CIA engagement. In the case of one project (*Zero Dark Thirty*), [] CIA officers told us that some of their official meetings with the entertainment industry representatives took place outside of CIA facilities. One of the officers stated that, with OPA's approval, his meetings outside of CIA facilities did not always include an OPA representative. [] CIA officers who supported entertainment industry projects (*Zero Dark Thirty* and *Argo*, respectively) told us that they were contacted directly by entertainment industry representatives after the initial meetings conducted with OPA. Under AR 6-1, OPA is the focal point for all CIA contacts—official or unofficial—with media representatives.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Several CIA officers who were involved in CIA support to three of the entertainment industry projects that we reviewed told us that they did not receive guidance from OPA concerning their interaction with entertainment industry representatives. Officers who had been interviewed by entertainment industry representatives in support of one project (*Zero Dark Thirty*) told us that they were unclear concerning what information could be discussed in the interviews and uncomfortable with the information being discussed. These officers thought that OPA could have better prepared them for the interviews and that OPA officials should have exercised greater control of the interviews. Based on our discussions with members of the CIA's Publications Review Board (PRB) and our review of information provided by PRB officials, many CIA employees who briefed or were interviewed by entertainment industry representatives did not submit materials to the PRB for review in advance of the briefings or interviews.⁶ AR 6-1 states that "[a]pproval under this regulation for any briefing of or contact with media representatives does not release a current or former employee from the legal obligation to submit any written or oral presentation for prepublication review."

(U//~~FOUO~~) There was an instance in which CIA allowed an entertainment industry representative to attend a CIA event in which information classified at the SECRET level was discussed.⁷ AR 6-1 states that "[u]nder no circumstances will information that is classified or information that reveals intelligence sources and methods be released to media or the public." There is no documentation that approval was obtained to waive

⁶ (U//~~FOUO~~) AR 6-2, *Agency Prepublication Review of Certain Material Prepared for Public Dissemination*, prescribes that "all current and former Agency employees and contractors, and others who are obligated by CIA secrecy agreement, to submit for prepublication review to the CIA's Publications Review Board (PRB) all intelligence-related materials intended for publication or public dissemination, whether they will be communicated in writing, speeches, or any other method."

⁷ (U) CIA officials told us that the filmmaker involved with *Zero Dark Thirty* was invited to the event so that he could absorb the emotion of the event and that he was told that he could not use anything he heard at the event for his project. During our audit fieldwork, the then Director, CIA called for an internal examination of the decision to allow the entertainment industry representative to attend the event.

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compliance with AR 6-1 and allow the entertainment industry representative to attend the event and that this decision was appropriate and in the CIA's best interest. We also noted three entertainment projects (*Top Chef-Covert Cuisine*, *The Secret War on Terror*, and *Argo*) in which foreign nationals may have participated in briefings, interviews, and visits provided by CIA. However, because of the lack of adequate records, we were unable to determine the extent of CIA's support to the eight projects, the extent to which foreign nationals participated in CIA-sponsored activities, and whether the Director, OPA approved the activities and participation by foreign nationals. Failure on the part of CIA officers to adhere to the regulatory requirements could result in unauthorized disclosures, inappropriate actions, and negative consequences for CIA. OPA has prepared draft guidance for persons holding CIA-sponsored clearances or having access to CIA information and facilities concerning contact with the entertainment industry and support to entertainment industry projects.

(U//~~FOUO~~) **Recommendation 1—(significant)—For the Director of Public Affairs:** Implement a central recordkeeping capability for entertainment industry requests to CIA for briefings, interviews, visits, or other support that documents key data, such as, but not limited to:

- a. Project name and description.
- b. Names of persons and entities requesting CIA support.
- c. Subject matter involved in the project.
- d. Nature and extent of support requested from CIA.
- e. History of prior requests for CIA support from the same persons and entities.
- f. Justification for the decision to support or deny support to the project.
- g. Detailed descriptions of briefings, interviews, visits or other CIA support to the project, such as transcripts of briefings provided by current and former CIA personnel and summaries of interviews of current and former CIA employees.
- h. Approval by the Director, OPA and the directorate involved for all CIA activities undertaken in support of the project.
- i. Time period of CIA participation in the project.
- j. Names of all current and former CIA personnel involved in activities undertaken in support of the project.
- k. Documentation that materials presented by current and former CIA personnel have been appropriately reviewed by the Publications Review Board.

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- l. Certification by the Director, OPA that briefings, interviews, and other CIA support did not divulge classified information or intelligence sources and methods.**
- m. Names and identifying information for all entertainment industry persons who had access to CIA personnel and/or facilities.**
- n. Assessments of entertainment industry personnel's cooperation with CIA during the project and whether the project furthered CIA's goal in engaging with the entertainment industry, and other information that would be useful in decisions concerning future requests for CIA support.**
- o. Costs incurred by CIA in supporting the project and whether reimbursement was obtained.**

(U//~~FOUO~~) Recommendation 2—For the Director of Public Affairs: Issue guidance on contact with the entertainment industry and support to entertainment industry projects to help ensure that current and former CIA employees comply with CIA security requirements in their interactions with the entertainment industry.

(U//~~FOUO~~) We received comments on a draft of this report from the Director, OPA in which she agreed with Recommendations 1 and 2; the comments were coordinated with the Office of General Counsel (OGC); the Office of Security; and the Office of Corporate Strategy, Policy, and Integration. The Director, OPA said that well before the audit began, OPA recognized the need for more consistent documentation in its interactions with the entertainment industry and the need to establish guidelines to the workforce on that interaction. OPA has been working to address these issues since October 2011. (b)(3) CIAAct

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Director, OPA said that OPA's new [redacted] will serve as the central online repository for the information sought in Recommendation 1 on each entertainment project. OPA officials provided us with evidence that [redacted] is fully operational and has the capability to document current entertainment projects. [redacted] allows users to quickly input and search for information about CIA's interaction on a project. OPA (b)(3) CIAAct officials provided documentation of sufficient recordkeeping for current entertainment projects, except for the involvement of the PRB in reviewing materials presented by current and former CIA personnel to entertainment industry representatives. Regarding review of materials by the PRB, the Director, OPA stated:

Our understanding is that [Information Review Officers] IRO's have the ability to clear information when needed, and OPA has asked them to do so. Although OPA knows generally what entertainment industry representatives are looking to discuss, representatives of the entertainment industry often do not provide advance

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questions, and so our officers are not in a position to provide advance talking points. According to the entertainment guidance, OPA officers meet with all briefers in advance of their meetings with the entertainment industry representatives, provide guidance on the ground rules, and remind officers not to provide any classified information or analysis. OPA believes this will protect classified information, and adding an extra layer of PRB review is unnecessary, duplicative, and would further burden the overstretched PRB resources.

(C) We discussed the Director, OPA's comments regarding PRB review of materials presented by current and former CIA personnel to entertainment industry representatives with the Chair, PRB. Notwithstanding the Director, OPA's comments, the Chair, PRB affirmed that presentations by current and former CIA personnel to entertainment industry representatives fall under AR 6-1 and AR 6-2. AR 6-1 states that "[a]pproval under this regulation for any briefing of or contact with media representatives does not release a current or former employee from the legal obligation to submit any written or oral presentation for prepublication review." AR 6-2 requires "all current and former Agency employees and contractors, and others who are obligated by CIA secrecy agreement, to submit for prepublication review to the CIA's Publications Review Board (PRB) all intelligence-related materials intended for publication or public dissemination, whether they will be communicated in writing, speeches, or any other method." AR 6-2 further prescribes that "[w]here no written material has been prepared specifically in contemplation of the speech, interview, or oral testimony, the individual must contact the PRB Chair or his representative to provide a summary of any and all topics that it is reasonable to assume may be discussed, and points that will or may be made. Unprepared or unrehearsed oral statements do not exempt an individual from possible criminal liability in the event they involve an unauthorized disclosure of classified information." The Chair, PRB told us that PRB review and approval of talking points would allow for careful consideration of all CIA equities related to the information, enable the PRB to provide guidance on topics that should not be discussed, and would facilitate the formal documentation of release decisions for future reference.

(C) In response to Recommendation 2, the Director, OPA offered the following comments concerning compliance with AR 6-1, which states that OPA is responsible for maintaining a central record of all CIA contacts with media representatives, by both OPA and other components, and providing the Office of Security copies of all reports of contacts with the media:

Neither OPA nor the Office of Security (OS) has interpreted the cited regulation to include all discussions with the media (which would include dozens of emails and telephone calls each day). Such contact is approved by D/OPA or other senior Agency leaders, and reporting of all official media contacts would be an unnecessary and overwhelming burden on both OPA and OS. Each and every visitor to the Agency compound is cleared through the (b)(3) CIAAct

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[redacted] which is maintained within the Office of Security. In addition, unofficial media contacts are cleared with OPA and OS through the (b)(3) CIAAct [redacted], which is also managed by OS. Finally, OPA works closely with the Office of Security to ensure awareness of sensitive information reported by media contacts.

(E) OPA's process for maintaining records of CIA contacts with media representatives when engaging with the entertainment industry implemented in response to Recommendation 1 satisfies the requirements of AR 6-1. Although the process is adequate, it could be further strengthened if OPA verified that all such contacts are reported to the Office of Security. In addition, OPA has promulgated guidelines for interactions with the entertainment industry. The guidelines—*Management Guidance on Contact with the Entertainment Industry and Support to Entertainment Industry Projects*—were approved by the Deputy Director, CIA and the Associate Deputy Director, CIA in September 2012. The guidelines instruct Agency managers on contact with the entertainment industry, document the responsibilities of OPA and CIA officers in such interactions, highlight factors for evaluating whether the CIA should support a particular project, and establish the requirement for approval by CIA executive leadership of each significant interaction. The Associate Deputy Director, CIA disseminated the guidelines to CIA managers in October 2012. In addition, OPA published a *What's News* article in December 2012 informing the CIA workforce of the guidelines. The actions taken satisfy Recommendation 2, and it is closed.

**(U//FOUO) CIA Has Not Been Reimbursed for
Costs Incurred in Supporting Entertainment
Industry Projects**

(U//FOUO) The CIA needs to establish a written policy concerning under what conditions reimbursement of costs incurred in providing support to entertainment industry projects should be sought. In the absence of a formal policy, there is increased risk that costs incurred by CIA will not be handled in a consistent manner and that CIA funds may be used for questionable expenditures.

(U//FOUO) An OPA official told us that decisions to support entertainment industry projects that result in the CIA incurring costs, such as a decision to (b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] are made in close coordination with OGC.

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The CIA's handling of these types of costs, as well as costs associated with additional security requirements and overtime needed to support entertainment industry projects, should be addressed in a written policy.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Recommendation 3—*For the Director of Public Affairs, in coordination with the General Counsel:* Establish a documented policy for determining when fees should be charged by CIA in providing support to entertainment industry projects and how those fees are collected.

(U) In comments on a draft of the report, the Director, OPA said that OPA consulted OGC on this recommendation. We have revised the recommendation based on the Director, OPA's comments. The Director, OPA suggested that documentation concerning how expenses incurred by the CIA in supporting an entertainment project fit within OPA's Congressional Budget Justification could be included in the [redacted] [redacted]. Although OPA's suggestion would help to document decisions concerning individual expenses, without a formal policy for determining when fees should be charged by CIA in providing support to entertainment industry projects, there is increased risk that expenses incurred by CIA will not be handled in a consistent manner.

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SECRET**Exhibit A****(U) Objectives, Scope, and Methodology**

(U) The objectives of this audit were to determine whether CIA processes for engaging with the entertainment industry are:

- Designed to support consistency and fairness in handling access requests.
- Designed to adequately protect classified and sensitive information.
- Effective in achieving the goals established by the Office of Public Affairs (OPA) for activities within the entertainment industry.
- In compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

(U) The audit topic was selected during the Office of Inspector General's annual planning process. The CIA is a frequent subject of entertainment projects, including books, television programs, documentaries, and motion pictures. The protection of national security information and CIA equities is essential when engaging with the entertainment industry and formal processes are important controls in mitigating associated risks.

(U) The scope of the audit included CIA engagement with entertainment projects—books, television programs, documentaries, and motion pictures—completed or in production between January 2006 and the initiation of the audit on 2 April 2012.

(U//~~FOUO~~) To accomplish the audit objectives, we:

- Reviewed the letter sent from Peter King, Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, to the CIA and Department of Defense (DoD) Inspectors General on 9 August 2011 in which he expressed concern regarding ongoing leaks of classified information relating to sensitive military operations; we also reviewed the media publications referenced in the letter to obtain additional background information on his concerns.
- Obtained from OPA a list of entertainment projects with which the CIA was involved that included books, television programs, documentaries, and motion pictures. The list comprised 22 projects, 16 of which were within the scope of the audit. We judgmentally selected eight projects—two books, two television programs, two documentaries, and two motion pictures—for review to assist in assessing CIA processes.
- Identified and reviewed applicable federal laws and Agency regulations related to CIA engagement with the media. We incorporated these laws and regulations into a checklist used to review entertainment projects and interview CIA officers involved with the projects.

Exhibit A is UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

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- Reviewed each project selected in the sample by reading the book or watching the documentary or television program for familiarization with the project, to assist in determining whether CIA engagement with the project was effective in achieving CIA's goal, and to identify current and former CIA officers involved with the project. We were unable to watch the two motion pictures selected as part of the sample because they were still in production at the time of the audit.
- Obtained and reviewed OPA's records of engagement on each project selected in the sample to assist in assessing CIA processes.
- Interviewed a judgmental sample of ☐ current CIA officers who were involved with five of the eight projects in the sample to assist in assessing CIA processes; due to limited records, we were unable to determine whether current CIA officers were involved with the remaining three projects and the total population of CIA officers involved with the projects.
- Interviewed the Chair of the Publications Review Board (PRB) to obtain an understanding of the PRB's role in CIA processes for engaging with the entertainment industry.
- Interviewed OPA officials to obtain an understanding of CIA processes.
- Reviewed the draft guidance developed by OPA for CIA interaction with the entertainment industry.
- Collected information regarding costs incurred as a result of CIA engagement with the entertainment industry.
- Obtained and reviewed DoD instructions and met with DoD OIG officers to benchmark practices.

(b)(5)

(U) We conducted this performance audit from April to June 2012 and in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on the audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on the audit objectives.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Comments on a draft of this report were provided by the Director, OPA in coordination with the Office of General Counsel; the Office of Security; the Office of Corporate Strategy, Policy, and Integration; and by the Chair, PRB. We considered the comments in preparing the final report.

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SECRET**Exhibit B****(U) Recommendations**

(U//~~FOUO~~) Recommendation 1—(significant)—For the Director of Public Affairs: Implement a central recordkeeping capability for entertainment industry requests to CIA for briefings, interviews, visits, or other support that documents key data, such as, but not limited to:

- a. Project name and description.
- b. Names of persons and entities requesting CIA support.
- c. Subject matter involved in the project.
- d. Nature and extent of support requested from CIA.
- e. History of prior requests for CIA support from the same persons and entities.
- f. Justification for the decision to support or deny support to the project.
- g. Detailed descriptions of briefings, interviews, visits, or other CIA support to the project, such as transcripts of briefings provided by current and former CIA personnel and summaries of interviews of current and former CIA employees.
- h. Approval by the Director, OPA and the directorate involved for all CIA activities undertaken in support of the project.
- i. Time period of CIA participation in the project.
- j. Names of all current and former CIA personnel involved in activities undertaken in support of the project.
- k. Documentation that materials presented by current and former CIA personnel have been appropriately reviewed by the Publications Review Board.
- l. Certification by the Director, OPA that briefings, interviews, and other CIA support did not divulge classified information or intelligence sources and methods.
- m. Names and identifying information for all entertainment industry persons who had access to CIA personnel and/or facilities.
- n. Assessments of entertainment industry personnel's cooperation with CIA during the project and whether the project furthered CIA's goal in engaging with the entertainment industry, and other information that would be useful in decisions concerning future requests for CIA support.
- o. Costs incurred by CIA in supporting the project and whether reimbursement was obtained.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Recommendation 2—For the Director of Public Affairs: Issue guidance on contact with the entertainment industry and support to entertainment industry projects to help ensure that current and former CIA employees comply with CIA security requirements in their interactions with the entertainment industry.

Exhibit B is UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Recommendation 3—*For the Director of Public Affairs, in coordination with the General Counsel:* Establish a documented policy for determining when fees should be charged by CIA in providing support to entertainment industry projects and how those fees are collected.

(U) The status of significant recommendations will be included in the Inspector General's semiannual reports to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency.

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SECRET**Exhibit C****(U) Audit Team**

(U//~~FOUO~~) This audit report was prepared by the Audit Staff, Office of Inspector General.

(b)(3) CIAAct

Exhibit C is UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

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**Central Intelligence Agency
Office of Inspector General
Investigations Staff**

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

(U) Potential Ethics Violations Involving Film Producers

(b)(3) CIAAct

16 September 2013

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**(C) Section I – Subjects**

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(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(U) Section II – Predication

5. ~~(C)~~ In response to a letter from the Honorable Peter T. King, Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, dated 9 August 2011, to the Central Intelligence Agency and Department of Defense (DoD) Inspectors General in which he expressed concerns that filmmakers working on the Usama Bin Laden (UBL) movie *Zero Dark Thirty* about the killing of UBL gained unprecedented access to CIA and special operations personnel, then Acting Inspector General ~~(b)(3) CIAAct~~ referred the matter to the CIA Office of Inspector General (OIG) Audit Staff. The objectives of the Audit Staff audit were to determine if the CIA's processes for engaging with the entertainment industry were designed to adequately protect classified and sensitive information, support consistency and fairness in handling access requests, and determine if the processes were effective in achieving the goals established by the Office of Public Affairs (OPA) for activities in the entertainment industry, and if the processes were in compliance with applicable laws and Agency regulations.

6. ~~(C)~~ On 8 June 2012, the CIA Investigations Staff (OIG/INV) received a referral from the OIG Audit Staff concerning information they obtained from an interview with ~~(b)(3) CIAAct~~

The Audit Staff interviewed ~~(b)(3) CIAAct~~ on 16 May 2012 as part of an audit of the CIA engagement with the entertainment industry.¹ During the interview, ~~(b)(3) CIAAct~~ said that filmmakers Kathryn Bigelow and Mark Boal had paid for her meals when they met off CIA campus while working on the UBL film project in 2011.² ~~(b)(3) CIAAct~~ also told the Audit Staff that Bigelow gave her a pair of black Tahitian pearl earrings. Based on this information, the OIG initiated an investigation to determine if Agency officers involved with the UBL film project committed any statutory or regulatory violations by accepting meals and gifts from filmmakers while participating in the UBL film project.³ Disclosures of classified

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

¹ (U) Draft report ~~(b)(3) CIAAct~~ dated 26 July 2012.

² (U) After the 1 May 2011 UBL raid operation filmmakers Bigelow and Boal who had begun scripting for the movie "Tora Bora" switched gears (stopped the Tora Bora project) and began working on the script for the movie *Zero Dark Thirty*.

~~(b)(3) CIAAct~~

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information related to the Agency's involvement with the UBL film project is being addressed in a separate ongoing investigation concerning the alleged disclosure of classified information by then D/CIA Leon Panetta at the 24 June 2011 UBL award ceremony(b)(3) CIAAct

(U) Section III - Potential Statutory or Regulatory Violations

7. (U) Federal criminal law, Title 18 U.S.C. § 201 (b), Bribery of Public Officials and Witnesses.

(b)(3) CIAAct

9. (U) Title 5 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) Part 2635 Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch.

(U) Section IV - Background

10. ~~(C)~~ Based on a review of documentation and interviews, the OIG determined the CIA's cooperation with filmmakers Mark Boal and Kathryn Bigelow began in 2010 when D/CIA Panetta and Bigelow met at an event where Bigelow discussed her film project "Tora Bora," a film project involving the CIA's failure to capture UBL, and D/CIA Panetta offered the Agency's assistance. In the spring of 2011, before the 1 May 2011 UBL raid, Micheal Feldman, the film's public relations representative, contacted the D/CIA's then Chief of Staff Jeremy Bash to renew the request for assistance for "Tora Bora." After the 1 May 2011 UBL raid, Boal sent a letter to then Director, Office of Public Affairs (D/OPA) George Little, requesting a phone call to discuss the film project. Boal sought the Agency's support to stop work on the Tora Bora project in light of the 1 May 2011 UBL raid and rewrite the Tora Bora script for the *Zero Dark Thirty* movie. On 20 May 2011, Feldman, Boal, D/OPA Little and Chief of Staff Bash met to discuss the film project.

meetings with Boal, Bash, the DD/CIA, and 10 NCS officers identified as involved in the hunt for UBL.⁴

(U) Section V - Investigative Findings

11. ~~(C)~~ The OIG investigation determined that [redacted] had meetings off CIA campus with filmmakers Mark Boal and Kathryn Bigelow in Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, [redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct

(U//FOUO) The 10 officers were assigned to NCS or OPA as of June 2011 [redacted]

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(b)(3) CIAAct
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

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(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

[redacted] was present at the Washington, D.C. area meetings. [redacted] attended one off campus meeting with [redacted] the filmmakers, and [redacted] Of the officers that met with the filmmakers off campus, [redacted] accepted gifts and/or meals during or after the meetings as identified below.

- (b)(1) • (E) [redacted] accepted one pair of black Tahitian pearl earrings estimated between (b)(3) CIAAct \$60 and \$70, and four to six meals between June and August 2011 at various locations in (b)(3) NatSecAct Washington, D.C., and in Los Angeles, CA, each averaging between \$70 and \$100.
- (b)(6) • (E) [redacted] accepted one bottle of tequila estimated at \$169.99 and three meals (b)(7)(c) between June and July 2011, two in Washington, D.C., and one in California estimated at \$50 to \$70; \$50, and \$30, respectively.
- (b)(1) • (U//FOUO) [redacted] accepted approximately four meals between June and July 2011 at (b)(3) CIAAct various locations in Washington, D.C., estimated at \$500. (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)

- (b)(3) CIAAct • (U//FOUO) [redacted] brought along [redacted] (b)(7)(c) [redacted] to the off campus (b)(3) CIAAct meeting he attended with [redacted] in June or July 2011. (b)(6) (b)(7)(c) [redacted] He said that [redacted] paid for his meal.

12. (E) The below subsections are organized by investigative subject. Each subsection focuses on allegations against a particular subject and OIG/INV's related investigation of those allegations. OIG/INV interviewed each subject, relevant witnesses and reviewed relevant documents and correspondence.

(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (E) Interview with [redacted] (Exhibit A)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

13. (S//NF) On 23 August 2012, the OIG interviewed [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct [redacted] who provided the following verbal account of her involvement with Boal (b)(3) NatSecAct and Bigelow in conjunction with the UBL film project. [redacted] arranged a meeting between Boal (b)(6) and Bigelow and [redacted] after the 1 May 2011 UBL (b)(7)(c) operation, to provide them background information on the UBL raid. [redacted] invited her to the (b)(1) meeting because Boal wanted to meet her after DD/CIA Michael Morrell and Bash [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(7)(c) in the UBL operation to Boal. [redacted] notified [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] about [redacted] invitation. [redacted] offered no objections to her meeting (b)(6) with the filmmakers. [redacted] introduced her to Boal [redacted] and told Boal that she was [redacted] (b)(7)(c) [redacted] said that the May 2011 meeting with Boal began a series of about five meetings with the filmmakers in CIA Headquarters (HQS) and between four to six official meetings outside HQS from June to July 2011. [redacted] was present at all (b)(3) CIAAct of the official meetings except the last meeting [redacted] had with Boal [redacted] in (b)(6) November 2011. [redacted] was not present at any of the three personal meetings with the (b)(7)(c) filmmakers.⁵

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

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(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(U) Black Tahitian pearl earrings

14. (C) [redacted] first introduction to filmmaker Kathryn Bigelow was in June 2011 over the telephone in Boal's hotel suite at The Jefferson Hotel in Washington, D.C. Boal convinced her to talk to Bigelow who was on location in Tahiti filming a Chanel commercial. Bigelow wanted to thank her for taking part in the UBL film project. [redacted] related the story she shared with Bigelow during the phone conversation [redacted]

(b)(7)(c)

[redacted] When she and [redacted] met with Boal and Bigelow at the Georgetown Ritz-Carlton in July 2011, Bigelow gave her the black Tahitian pearl earrings from Tahiti as a small gift. [redacted] saw Bigelow give her the earrings and said nothing.

15. (C) At the OIG's request, [redacted] voluntarily provided the OIG with the round, black Tahitian pearl earrings that Bigelow gave to her. [redacted] signed a release form authorizing the OIG to take the earrings for an appraisal. Subsequently, the OIG sought out a [redacted] jeweler to visually inspect the pearl earrings. The jeweler offered his professional opinion that the earrings were not worth a formal appraisal citing the pearls were painted, not genuine black pearls, and that the posts were not platinum. The jeweler said the appraisal would cost more than the earrings. The jeweler also said that he would ask between \$60 and \$70 if he were selling the earrings on eBay.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(U) Off campus official meetings with Boal and Bigelow involving meals

16. (C) According to [redacted] [redacted] decided to relocate the official meetings with Boal from HQS to hotels in Washington, D.C. in late June 2011 to minimize the talk and avoid the jealousy in the CTC [redacted] (b)(7)(c) In an interview related to OIG Audit Report (b)(3) CIAAct [redacted] Audit of CIA's Processes for Engaging with the Entertainment Industry, [redacted] further explained [redacted]

(b)(7)(c)

17. (C) [redacted] met with Boal approximately four to six times in his Jefferson Hotel suite in Washington, D.C. between June and July 2011 for two to four hours each time. [redacted] recalled that Boal ordered room service at least once for the three of them in his hotel suite which included drinks, appetizers, and food. She also recalled that on another occasion she, [redacted] and Boal took a break for dinner in the Jefferson Hotel restaurant.⁶ They also had dinner at Citronelle restaurant possibly during the third week of June. Her meals included drinks, appetizers, main entrée, and dessert averaged between \$70 and \$100. [redacted] further recalled that Boal always paid for the meals. [redacted] participated in the meals, did not pay, never offered to pay, nor say that UBL film project participants could not or should not accept meals from Boal or Bigelow. [redacted] said that she relied on OPA for guidance and took

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct OPA's lead.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

⁶ (U) The Jefferson Hotel restaurant is Plume.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
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(b)(7)(e)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
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(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)
 (b)(7)(e)

(b)(1) (U) *Social contact with Boal and Bigelow⁹*

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6) 18. (C) [] said that she soon developed a friendship with Boal and Bigelow
 (b)(7)(c) resulting from the times they spent together on the UBL film project. [] recalled
 three social contacts with Boal and Bigelow that occurred (b)(7)(c) [] The first
 social contact was in July 2011 a day after she and [] met with Boal and Bigelow at the
 Georgetown Ritz-Carlton hotel in Washington, D.C. [] returned to the Ritz the next
 day and had drinks with Boal and Bigelow.

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

19. (C) [] second social contact with Boal and Bigelow occurred in August
 2011 while she was on vacation in Los Angeles, CA (b)(7)(c) [] Before departing to Los
 Angeles, [] asked her boss, [] if it was okay to contact Boal and
 Bigelow and inform them of her plans to be in Los Angeles and to meet them for dinner.
 [] did not voice any objections and asked her to tell Boal and Bigelow that he said
 hello. [] met Boal and Bigelow for dinner at the Soho House on Sunset Boulevard in
 West Hollywood, Los Angeles. Bigelow paid for her meal which [] estimated to cost
 between \$40 and \$50. Bigelow was a member at the Soho House and offered to have a
 screening of *Zero Dark Thirty* in a private room for [] when the movie
 opened. [] checked with [] in the OPA about Bigelow's offer, and he said not to
 accept it. [] said that the Soho House meeting was her last meeting with Bigelow.
 [] recalled that she gave Bigelow a mini Burka wine bottle cover and a publicly
 available Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) UBL wanted poster of UBL with "Deceased"
 written across it.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

20. (S//NF) [] third social contact, and last official meeting, was with Boal
 in November 2011. [] According to [] Boal
 was [] heading to Islamabad to film and wanted her to review the UBL movie script.

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

10 (C) [] did not advise [] to file a Form 879, Outside
 Activity Request (OAR), for her unofficial contact with Boal and Bigelow
 until December 2011.

(b)(3) CIAAct

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(b)(7)(c)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

[redacted] again contacted [redacted] in the OPA about Boal's request.¹¹ [redacted] told her that he and [redacted] had already reviewed the UBL movie script telephonically with Boal and had concerns with the script's depiction of detainee debriefings.¹²

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

21. (S) In November 2011, [redacted] spent two hours reviewing the UBL movie script in Boal's [redacted] Hotel room [redacted]. After reviewing the script, she spent about eight hours with Boal while he shopped for his girlfriend. [redacted] said that when she saw something by Prada that she liked, Boal said he knew the designer personally and offered her tickets to a Prada fashion show. [redacted] did not think she could accept the tickets and declined Boal's offer. She also declined Boal's invitation to the *Zero Dark Thirty* movie screening and Boal's suggestion that she visit the movie set. [redacted] maintained that the time spent with Boal after the UBL script review was just between friends. After shopping, [redacted] said that she treated Boal to a \$150 dinner [redacted].

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1)

22. (C) [redacted] said that between September 2011 and January 2012 she exchanged non-work related casual pleasantries via e-mail with Boal once every three weeks and with Bigelow approximately once every other month.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

23. (C) [redacted] also contacted [redacted] in January 2012 after Boal, knowing that she was going to be in Los Angeles in January 2012, begged her to meet [redacted]. Rather than meeting [redacted] while she was on vacation and used it to communicate [redacted] three times between late January and early Feb 2012.¹³ [redacted] also used her cell phone to call [redacted]. They talked for an hour. [redacted] said she blocked her cell phone number to prevent [redacted] from having her number. [redacted] told her to have [redacted] go through Boal who in turn should submit an official request via the OPA requesting permission to meet with [redacted]. Boal did not submit the request to the OPA to her knowledge.

(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

24. (C) [redacted] last conversation with Boal occurred in May 2012 when she told him that she could no longer maintain contact with him. Boal said he understood but e-mailed her another three clips from the movie set and said that she could send the clips to spam or delete them. [redacted] explained that Boal would send her updates from the movie set.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

[redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c) (b)(3) CIAAct

¹³ (C) In a Lotus Notes dated 18 January 2012 from [redacted] to [redacted] OPA [redacted] and [redacted] OPA [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct highlighted that Boal had contacted the OPA [redacted] to give her a sense of their activities. Boal also requested to meet with DD/CIA.

(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

25. (C) [redacted] recalled that Boal presented her with a release form to sign at one of their meetings. [redacted] was present when she read the release. Boal told her that someone did not like how they were portrayed in *The Hurt Locker* and sued him, hence the release form.

[redacted] did not sign the release form [redacted] (b)(5)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

26. (C) [redacted] was adamant that she proactively reported her contacts and meetings with Boal, Bigelow, and [redacted] to [redacted] management, the OPA, and the Office of General Counsel (OGC). [redacted] said that she always informed the OPA of her personal discussions and meetings with Boal including the dinner in Los Angeles [redacted]

[redacted] said there were times she claimed overtime for meeting with Boal and Bigelow after hours but not for the social meetings or the UBL script review [redacted] asked

[redacted] if she could claim overtime for the after hour meetings [redacted] said that

[redacted] overtime was authorized and that she could charge it. [redacted] reported her social contact with Boal and Bigelow via the Form 879 [Outside Activities Request], as [redacted] requested. In a LN from [redacted] dated 6 January 2012, [redacted] told [redacted] that he updated the [redacted] OPA on the UBL film project and that [redacted] had been keeping him informed about her contacts with Boal. [redacted] further states that the OPA advised [redacted] to complete the Form 879 to keep her whole and documented. [redacted] advises [redacted] to note in her Form 879 that she has kept the OPA informed every time Boal has contacted her and that her relationship with Boal has been a work-sanctioned contact.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3)

CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(1)(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3)

NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(U) *The Form 879 for unofficial contact with the media*

27. (C) On 9 January 2012, [redacted] submitted her initial Form 879 as a volunteer activity working with Boal and Bigelow as a consultant [redacted]

[redacted] included her social meeting with Boal and Bigelow in Los Angeles and her meeting with Boal [redacted] On 6 February 2012, [redacted] informed [redacted] that she needed to resubmit the Form 879 and clarified that she was to report her ongoing social contact with Boal. [redacted] OPA [redacted] offered [redacted] guidance and clarification regarding reporting media contacts and instructed [redacted] to resubmit the Form 879 if her contact with the media was social and did not involve Agency matters. [redacted] resubmitted the form the same day and clarified the relationship that it began as an official contact but changed to a social contact. On 24 February 2012, the OPA and OGC [redacted] non-concurred stating it was still an official contact. [redacted] (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

On 28 February 2012, the Office of Security (OS) disapproved [redacted] request to continue the media contact and requested [redacted] acknowledge understanding of the guidance and willingness to adhere by submitting an updated contact form officially ending the contact.

[redacted] responded that she ceased all contact with Boal and Bigelow as she previously stated in a 7 May 2012 LN to [redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

28. (C) [redacted] offered that the "7th Floor" approved the cooperation with Boal and Bigelow. They met with DD/CIA Morrell, so she assumed her meetings with Boal and

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

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Bigelow were okay. OIG obtained an email from (b)(3) CIAAct dated 14 July 2011, regarding "Schedule for Kathryn Bigelow meetings," identifying a scheduled meeting with AD/CIA Michael Morell at 3:00PM. (b)(3) CIAAct was adamant that she received no guidance from the OPA, the OGC, or the OS regarding her official or personal meetings with Boal and Bigelow. (b)(3) CIAAct did not recall taking ethics training. (b)(3) CIAAct offered that any ethics training she may have taken should be documented in her Agency training record.¹⁴ The OIG/INV reviewed (b)(3) CIAAct Employee BIC(b)(3) CIAAct noting that it does not appear that (b)(3) CIAAct received any ethics training.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3)
NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct

29. (S) (b)(3) CIAAct provided the following verbal account detailing her meetings at HQS with Boal and Bigelow. Boal and Bigelow were interested in the human element for the *Dark Thirty* movie and visited the CTC (b)(3) CIAAct offices to get the working condition atmospherics and the personal interactions the team experienced working the UBL operation.

(b)(7)(c) (b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct also showed Boal (b)(3) NatSecAct covered up classified on her desk when Boal and Bigelow visited. (b)(6)

(b)(7)(c) The AC1 mockup was used to practice the UBL operation and is currently on display in the CIA museum hallway. (b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6) According to a LN (b)(3) CIAAct briefed Bigelow and Boal on the AC1 model 15 July 2011 before they toured the (b)(3) CIAAct building also known as the "Vault."

30. (S) (b)(3) CIAAct said that the UBL operation team provided Boal and Bigelow background on the intelligence portions of the UBL raid. According to (b)(3) CIAAct there were (b)(3) NatSecAct procedures to follow regarding what she could discuss during the meetings with Boal and Bigelow. (b)(3) CIAAct added that she provided an overview to Boal of the intelligence case (b)(7)(c) (b)(7)(c) for the public roll out plan about the UBL raid. (b)(3) CIAAct advised she felt comfortable with her involvement with the UBL film project and was very confident about discussing the public roll out plan information with Boal. (b)(3) CIAAct said that the conversation topics she shared with Boal and Bigelow during meetings included the following:

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3)
NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

- (C) How the UBL operation team got from point A to point B.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

¹⁴ (S) (b)(3) CIAAct was not required to take ethics training. According to Agency guidance, only certain CIA officers are required to take the annual ethics training. These include Senior Intelligence Service officers, officers who complete the Public Financial Disclosure Reports (Form 278), employees designated to file Financial Disclosure Reports (Form 450), and those officers whose positions require them to have significant involvement in the procurement process such as Contracting Officers and Contracting Officer Technical Representatives.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3)
NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(5)
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

(C) Interview with [REDACTED] (Exhibit B)

33. (C) On 11 September 2012, the OIG interviewed [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] who provided the following verbal account of his interactions with Boal and
 Bigelow in conjunction with the UBL film project. [REDACTED] met with Boal and Bigelow

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

(b)(7)(c)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

outside CIA HQS four times. The first time was at a hotel restaurant/bar in Georgetown, Washington, D.C. with Boal and [] [] said that a meal was provided and consumed by all parties. [] approximated his meal to cost \$50 to \$70. His second meeting with the filmmakers occurred at Bistro Dupont restaurant also in Washington, D.C., with Boal and [] He could not recall the date. [] said that everyone consumed a meal. He approximated his meal to cost \$50. [] did not know who paid for these meals, however, he did not pay. [] third meeting with Boal, Bigelow, and [] occurred at the same Georgetown hotel restaurant/bar as the first meeting. Boal paid for his drinks and an appetizer which he approximated to be \$30. [] last meeting with the filmmakers occurred while he was on vacation in Los Angeles, CA. [] contacted Boal via his personal cell phone. They met at a restaurant in Hollywood and Boal paid for his meal which he estimated at approximately \$30. [] could not recall the restaurant name. After the meal, he rode with Boal to a beach house in Malibu, CA, where they met with Bigelow and someone he believed was a friend of Bigelow's from the Los Angeles art community. [] said they relaxed and talked before he continued his vacation in the San Francisco, CA, area. [] said that [] was aware of his meeting with the filmmakers in Los Angeles.

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(7)(e)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

34. (c) [] said that Boal presented him with a bottle of tequila at one of the meetings in Washington, D.C. Boal told him it was worth several hundred dollars. []

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

16 (c) [] met with Boal and (b)(7)(c) at Bistrot Du Coin located in Dupont Circle in Washington, D.C. The OIG researched restaurants in Washington D.C. and did not find a Bistro Dupont.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(7)(e)

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- (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

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consumed the tequila later with friends. [] could not recall the brand of tequila, but later located it and said it cost approximately \$169.99. [] said that he did not report the gift.¹⁸

35. (E) [] said his future contact was only with Boal, and was limited to phone calls and e-mails using personal accounts. []

[] recalled that his last communication with Boal was in February 2012.

- (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

36. (S//NF) [] was under the impression that the content of the discussions with the filmmakers was to provide context to what they were asking about, and that Agency employees should be "helpful," but that no clear "red lines" were provided by the OPA. [] said that among the CTC cadre they developed their own "red line" topics which they would not discuss or elaborate upon. [] said that in meetings at HQS with Boal, he provided some background on history of the raid, described time periods, field experiences of a typical case officer, impact of the Khowst attack on personnel in terms of morale and following efforts, the strategic view of the hunt for UBL and ongoing efforts to dismantle Al-Qa'ida, and the relationship with the US military, in general, on operations. Regarding meetings where Bigelow was present, [] said she seemed most interested in "what's it like in the field."

- (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

37. (E) [] indicated neither the OPA nor the OGC provided guidance on what could or could not be discussed, or guidance on reporting meetings with the filmmakers. [] said that [] were aware of all his meetings with the filmmakers. [] recalled a release form circulating that he believed [] was aware of from the filmmakers. [] said that he did not sign anything. [] also said that he has not had ethics training²⁰. The OIG/INV reviewed [] Employee BIO, noting that it does not appear that [] received any ethics training.

- (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

¹⁸ (U//FOUO) Per 5 CFR 2635.203, and as relevant to this investigation, the following items are not gifts: (1) modest items of food and refreshments, such as soft drinks, coffee, and donuts offered other than as part of a meal; or (2) anything for which an employee pays full market value.

- (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

²⁰ (E) [] was not required to take ethics training. According to Agency guidance, only certain CIA officers are required to take the annual ethics training. These include Senior Intelligence Service officers, officers who complete the Public Financial Disclosure Reports (Form 278), employees designated to file Financial Disclosure Reports (Form 450), and those officers whose positions require them to have significant involvement in the procurement process such as Contracting Officers and Contracting Officer Technical Representatives.

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- (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

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(U) Interview with (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6) (Exhibit C)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

38. (C) On 31 August 2012, the OIG interviewed (b)(7)(c) who provided the following information concerning his involvement in the UBL film project. (b)(7)(c) said that the authorization to support the UBL film project came from the D/CIA suite.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(7)(c) attended most of the meetings. (b)(7)(c) said that he became involved with the UBL film project in June 2011 after (b)(7)(c). The OPA's role in the UBL film project was to attend meetings with Boal and Bigelow and Agency officers. (b)(7)(c) explained that Boal needed to talk to Agency officers as part of the project to get a feeling of what it was like to hunt UBL. Those officers were not to interact with the filmmakers without an OPA representative being present. Many unclassified details about the UBL hunt were in the public domain, and if discussions with Boal and Bigelow ventured from the publicly available information, CTC officers could pull back from the discussion.

(U) Off campus meetings with Boal and Bigelow

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3)
NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

39. (C) (b)(7)(c) recalled attending a meeting with Boal, (b)(7)(c) after work at a restaurant in Georgetown the last week in June or first week in July 2011. (b)(7)(c) said that he had a meal which he did not pay for and left after an hour and a half. (b)(7)(c) stayed, and he assumed (b)(7)(c) paid for his meal, and hers. (b)(7)(c) did not know who paid for (b)(7)(c) meal. (b)(7)(c) understanding of the rules, as discussed with (b)(7)(c) was that the OPA pays for their meals when they meet with reporters. (b)(7)(c) did not recall if the OPA provided guidance to (b)(7)(c) about meeting with Boal and Bigelow or that the filmmakers were not to pay for Agency employees' meals. (b)(7)(c) assumed (b)(7)(c) provided guidance to (b)(7)(c). He did not receive gifts or gratuities from the filmmakers, (b)(7)(c).

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(7)(c) OIG/INV reviewed (b)(7)(c) Employee BIO noting that it does not appear that (b)(7)(c) received any ethics training.²¹

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(e)

²¹ (b)(7)(c) was not required to take ethics training. According to Agency guidance, only certain CIA officers are required to take the annual ethics training. These include Senior Intelligence Service officers, officers who complete the Public Financial Disclosure Reports (Form 278), employees designated to file Financial Disclosure Reports (Form 450), and those officers whose positions require them to have significant involvement in the procurement process such as Contracting Officers and Contracting Officer Technical Representatives.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)
 (b)(7)(e)

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

40. (C) Regarding [redacted] interaction with Boal and Bigelow [redacted] said that [redacted] kept him informed of her off campus meetings with Boal and Bigelow. [redacted] recalled that [redacted] told him that she met with Boal [redacted] for drinks and dinner. [redacted] made sure [redacted] submitted a Form 879 for her unofficial contact with Boal and Bigelow. [redacted] initially submitted a Form 879 on 9 January 2012 and reported her contact with Boal and Bigelow as a volunteer activity, but the OPA rejected it stating it was a media contact and not a volunteer activity. [redacted] was instructed to resubmit the Form 879 changing it from a volunteer contact to a media contact with additional explanation of the relationship. [redacted] resubmitted the Form 879 on 6 February 2012 explaining that the once official contact developed into a friendship.²² [redacted] recalled another instance when [redacted] said that Boal wanted her to meet [redacted]. The OPA informed Boal that he needed to coordinate requests to meet with Agency officers via [redacted] said that months after CTC officers met with the filmmakers, [redacted] put a stop to CTC officers having further media contact.

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

41. (S//NF) [redacted] did not read the *Zero Dark Thirty* script; however, Boal walked them through the script by reading it to them during four or five telephone conversations in September or October 2011. [redacted] checked the names in the script to ensure they were not close to true names. He and [redacted] also checked for egregious errors in the script like having dogs in the interrogation scenes. [redacted] did not know where Boal obtained information about dogs in an interrogation room. He and [redacted] told Boal that the depiction was inaccurate, that CIA would never have dogs in an interrogation room. [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct ected to the scenes. Another inaccuracy with the script involved Agency officers partying and shooting guns. [redacted] told Boal that Agency officers would not do that. [redacted] did not have authority to approve the script, would not receive a copy of the script, and he was not sure if requirements to preview the script existed.

(b)(3)
 CIAAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

42. (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was aware of the release form that Boal wanted Agency officers who participated in the UBL film project to sign. [redacted]

[redacted] did not sign it.

(C) Interview with [redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3)

NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

43. (S//NF) On 4 September 2012, the OIG interviewed [redacted] who provided a verbal account of his interactions with Boal and Bigelow in conjunction with the UBL film project.²³ [redacted] met Boal and Bigelow for drinks at the Ritz-Carlton hotel in Georgetown, Washington, D.C for about 30 minutes. He had a glass of wine [redacted] said that he offered to pay for their drinks, but Boal and Bigelow said they would get [redacted] said this was the only time he met with Boal and Bigelow outside HQS. [redacted] never encouraged him to accept gifts from the filmmakers. Boal offered him tickets to the movie premiere, but he did not find the offer genuine. [redacted] said that he gave Boal a copy of the book "Kill Bin Laden" that he signed with apologies since Boal wrote the screenplay based on the book that became invalid once UBL was killed. [redacted] did not recall any information about the release forms.

(b)(3) CIAAct

(U) Interview with [redacted] (Exhibit D)

(b)(7)(c)

44. (U//~~FOUO~~) On 19 March 2013, the OIG interviewed [redacted]

[redacted] who provided a verbal account of her interaction with Boal and Bigelow in conjunction with the UBL film project.²⁵ [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct [redacted] (b)(7)(c) (b)(3) CIAAct told her that the decision for the OPA to participate in Boal and Bigelow's UBL film project came from the D/CIA office.

45. (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

[redacted] said that Boal and Bigelow received tours of CTC spaces and that she was present when Bigelow visited [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct building at the CIA, which was the CTC location of the UBL "war room." At the time of the visit, the building had already been returned to its pre-UBL war room condition.

²⁴ (U//~~FOUO~~) Per 5 CFR 2635.203, modest items of food and refreshments, such as soft drinks, coffee, and donuts, offered other than as part of a meal are not considered gifts.

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

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SECRET//NOFORN

46. (U//~~FOUO~~) Classified information was not disclosed to Boal and Bigelow.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(U) Off campus meetings with Boal and Bigelow

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

47. (U//~~FOUO~~) [] recollected the following information about the off campus meetings. [] made the decision for certain CTC officers to meet off campus with the filmmakers from mid-July to maybe August 2011. [] Jealousy in CTC over who was getting "face time" with the filmmakers led the OPA to move some meetings off campus.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

48. (C) The first off campus meeting was held in Boal's suite at The Jefferson Hotel in Washington, D.C., in July 2011. She and [] had lunch served in Boal's suite. [] recalled ordering a grilled cheese, French fries, and soda. A second off campus meeting with Boal, and Bigelow was held at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in Georgetown during 14-17 July 2011. [] recalled. [] recalled having tomato soup at that meeting. Both meetings occurred during the day at lunch time over the weekend, and each meeting ran four or five hours.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

49. (C) A third off campus meeting was held at Bistrot Du Coin with Boal, [] []²⁸ described this as a "getting to know you meeting," which was not unusual. [] paid for her and [] meal with her personal credit card. [] maintained that she shreds her credit card receipts and no longer has any from 2011.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

50. (C) She, [] Boal, and Bigelow also had dinner at Citronelle restaurant in Georgetown and either Boal or Bigelow paid for the meal. [] did not recall the exact amount but guessed that her share of meal was approximately \$125. [] described the dinner at Citronelle as more social than work related. [] explained that she, [] and Boal had spent most of the day discussing topics related to the UBL movie. And, at the end of the long day, someone suggested going for a bite to eat.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

51. (C) She, Boal, and [] had dinner at The Jefferson Hotel restaurant Plume on another occasion. [] did not pay and assumed the meal was charged to Boal's room. [] recalled that the price of her meal at Plume was similar but maybe slightly less than her meal at Citronelle. [] also recalled meeting Boal for brunch early in the film project. [] would have paid for that meal as was the [] standard procedure.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c) referred to [] met with Boal and Bigelow at CIA HQS as part of the UBL film project. In his 4 September 2012 interview report (IR), paragraph 8, [] denied meeting off CIA campus with Boal and Bigelow other than one time at the Ritz-Carlton hotel. [] said during his 31 August 2012 interview (IR paragraph 7), that [] had a meal at a Georgetown restaurant. During his 11 September 2012 interview, [] said that he had a meal with [] Boal, and [] at a Georgetown restaurant in late June or early July 2011.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

SECRET//NOFORN

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~*(U) Guidance to UBL film project participants*(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

52. (U//~~FOUO~~) [] did not provide guidance to the CTC officers who participated in the UBL film project about accepting meals from Boal and Bigelow.²⁹ She does not recall anyone asking if it was okay to accept meals. She never had discussions about who would pick up the tab for social dinners. [] was not aware of anyone accepting gifts from Boal or Bigelow to include jewelry or alcohol. [] did not see a copy of the script and was not offered tickets to the movie.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

53. (U//~~FOUO~~) [] did not have concerns about the off campus meetings with the filmmakers or with the information discussed at the meetings. [] offered that the off campus meetings were quieter and the purpose was to obtain unclassified information to develop the female officers character and to talk through issues. [] never sought guidance from the OGC about meeting with the filmmakers. [] explained that none of the participants on or off campus ever expressed concerns to her about meeting with the filmmakers or the topics discussed. [] offered that it was not unusual for undercover officers to meet with reporters. (b)(5) [] the filmmakers wanted the UBL participants to sign non-disclosure agreements (NDA).³⁰

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

54. (U//~~FOUO~~) [] also said that she would not have offered guidance or advice to the CTC officers about having unofficial contact with the media or the requirement to complete a Form 879. [] did not consider movie producers to be reporters. According to [] the OPA considers representatives from Hollywood to be distinct from media representatives since they have different missions. Media representatives report factual information, whereas Hollywood representatives weave stories containing some fictional elements around factual events.

55. (U//~~FOUO~~) []

[] realized that she had not paid for some meals. To rectify the situation, [] believes that she wrote to Boal and Bigelow's production company in California and made a good faith effort to repay the money by mailing a check for \$500. [] explained that she called Boal and asked how much he paid for her meals during the UBL film project. [] and Boal agreed that \$500 was a fair value. [] said that when the OIG contacted her for the interview in January 2013, she searched for the duplicate check and evidence that it had been cashed but could not find either.

(b)(3)
CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

56. (U//~~FOUO~~) [] did not submit a voucher to be reimbursed for meals she paid for during official meetings with Boal. According to [] it was not unusual for [] officials to not seek reimbursement when they use their personal credit cards to pay for meals consumed

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

³⁰ (U//~~FOUO~~) [] described the release form Boal wanted participants to sign as Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDA). The form was a release form and not a NDA.

(b)(5)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3)
NatSecAct
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(b)(7)(e)~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

during official meetings. [] did not recall if overtime was authorized for the external meetings that were held outside normal business hours with Boal and Bigelow. She did not recall anyone asking if overtime was authorized and did not recall submitting a request for overtime.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(7)(d)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**(U) Section VI – Department of Justice (DoJ) Declination**

78. (C) On 4 December 2012, the Department of Justice declined prosecution in favor of administrative action.

(U) Section VII – Investigative Findings

79. (U//~~FOUO~~) The OIG investigation determined the following:

- (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
- a) (C) [redacted] all accepted gifts, to include meals, from Boal and or Bigelow. (b)(1)
- b) (C) The OIG did not discover any evidence that [redacted] were given (b)(3) CIAAct
any guidance regarding acceptance of meals and gifts from the filmmakers. (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
- c) (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct
performance of official duties. (b)(6) during the (b)(7)(c)
- d) (U//~~FOUO~~) The OIG did not discover any evidence that [redacted] knowingly accepted any (b)(6)
meals from the filmmakers. (b)(7)(c)
- e) (C) The OIG did not discover any evidence that the OPA or any other office in the CIA provided clear guidance to any of the NCS officers who met with the filmmakers about what could or could not be discussed or any rules of conduct regarding those interactions with the exception that [redacted] was eventually told to submit a Form 879 to report her social contact with the filmmakers, and subsequently, to cease her interactions with the filmmakers.
- (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
- f) (U//~~FOUO~~) The OIG did not discover any evidence that the NCS officers who met with the filmmakers disclosed any classified information to the filmmakers.
- g) (U//~~FOUO~~) The OPA did issue *Management Guidance on Contact with the Entertainment Industry and Support to Entertainment Industry Projects* in December 2012 which addresses the lack of guidance issues discussed in this report.⁴¹

(U) Section VIII – Recommendations

[redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

⁴¹ (U//~~FOUO~~) The *Management Guidance on Contact with the Entertainment Industry and Support to Entertainment Industry Projects* is located at

[redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1) (U) Section VIII - Exhibits

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct Exhibit A - ~~(S//NF)~~ Interview Report by Special Agent [redacted] detailing the interview of [redacted]

(b)(6) [redacted] 23 August 2012

(b)(7)(c)

Exhibit B - ~~(C)~~ Interview Report by Special Agent detailing the interview of [redacted]
11 September 2012

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

Exhibit C - ~~(S//NF)~~ Interview Report by Special Agent [redacted] detailing the interview of [redacted]
31 August 2012

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

Exhibit D - ~~(S//NF)~~ Interview Report by [redacted] detailing the interview of [redacted] 19 March 2012

Exhibit E - ~~(S//NF)~~ Interview Report by Special Agent [redacted] detailing the interview of [redacted]
17 April 2012

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(7)(d)

Exhibit F - ~~(C)~~ Interview Report by [redacted] detailing the interview of [redacted] 17 April 2013

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(7)(d)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

EXHIBIT A

Subj: (U) Potential Ethics Violations Involving Film Producers

(b)(3) CIAAct

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

23 August 2012

INTERVIEW REPORT

INTERVIEWEE: [REDACTED]

PREPARED BY: (b)(3) CIAAct [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: (U//~~ATUO~~) (b)(3) CIAAct [REDACTED] Acceptance of Gifts and Gratuities from Outside Sources

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

1. ~~(S//NF)~~ On 23 August 2012, Office of Inspector General (OIG) Special Agents [REDACTED] (b)(3) CIAAct [REDACTED] interviewed [REDACTED] regarding the receipt of gifts and gratuities from outside sources in connection with a movie production about Usama Bin Laden (UBL) title *Zero Dark Thirty*. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] voluntarily provided the round, black Tahitian pearl earrings that filmmaker Kathryn Bigelow gave to her as a gift. [REDACTED] consented to having the earrings appraised and signed a Receipt for Property Received/Returned/Released/Seized form granting Agents [REDACTED] (b)(3) CIAAct [REDACTED] permission to have the earrings appraised.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

3. ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] stated that (b)(7)(c) [REDACTED] Office of Public Affairs (OPA) media spokesperson [REDACTED] With seventh floor authorization, [REDACTED] CTC and Hollywood screenwriter Mark Boal and film producer, Kathryn Bigelow after the 1 May 2011 UBL

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) NatSecAct [REDACTED]

1
~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

(b)(1) ~~SECRET/NOFORN~~
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 INTERVIEWEE: (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

(b)(1) operation, [redacted] advised. [redacted] stated that (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) Boal and Bigelow to
 (b)(3) CIAAct meet with then (b)(7)(c)
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6) obtain background information on the UBL raid. [redacted] stated that [redacted] asked if she
 (b)(7)(c) would agree to meet with Boal, and if yes, could she be available in 45 minutes.

[redacted] related that [redacted] invited her because Deputy Director (DD/CIA) Michael J.
 Morrell and former Chief of Staff Jeremy Bash (b)(7)(c) in the Bin Laden
 operation to Boal, and he wanted to meet her. [redacted] stated that she notified

(b)(3) CIAAct [redacted] about [redacted] request.
 (b)(6) [redacted] offered no objections to her meeting with the filmmaker. (b)(1) [redacted] stated.
 (b)(7)(c)

(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5)
 (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) (b)(6)
 (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(7)(c) (b)(7)(c)
 (b)(6) 4. ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] stated that [redacted] introduced her to Boal as [redacted] and said
 (b)(7)(c) that [redacted] was [redacted]

[redacted] stated that the May 2011 meeting began
 a series of about five meetings with the filmmakers in Headquarters (HQS) and between
 four to six meetings outside HQS from mid-June to late July 2011. [redacted] stated that
 [redacted] was present at all the meetings she attended except three personal meetings and
 one last official meeting she had with Boal in November 2011.

(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(1)
 (b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(7)(c) (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(5)
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

SECRET/NOFORN**INTERVIEWEE:**

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

SECRET/NOFORN

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

INTERVIEWEE:

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

9. (e) [redacted] stated that the UBL operation team provided the filmmakers background on the intelligence portions of the UBL raid. [redacted] added that she provided an overview to Boal of the intelligence case [redacted] for the public roll out plan about the Bin Laden raid. [redacted] advised she felt comfortable with her involvement with the UBL movie project and was very confident about discussing the public roll out plan information with Boal.

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)
 (b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

10. (e) [redacted] advised that Boal and Bigelow visited CTC [redacted] offices to get the working condition atmospherics and the personal interactions the team experienced working the UBL operation. [redacted] commented that Boal and Bigelow were interested in the human element for the *Zero Dark Thirty* movie. They wanted to know the interaction

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

[redacted] stated that she covered up classified on her desk when Boal and Bigelow visited.

[redacted] stated that Bigelow and Boal also toured the [redacted] office also known as the Vault.

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(5)
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

INTERVIEWEE:

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

External meetings/Gifts and Gratuities

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1) 13. (C) [] stated [] decided to relocate meetings with Boal from HQS to
 (b)(3) CIAAct Boal's hotel in late June 2011 to minimize the talk and avoid the jealousy in CTC

(b)(3) NatSecAct [] advised
 (b)(6) that she and [] met with Boal approximately four to six times in his Jefferson Hotel
 (b)(7)(c) suite in Washington D.C. in June and July. The meetings lasted two to four hours,
 [] recalled. [] advised that she, [] and Boal would break for dinner in
 the hotel restaurant. [] recalled her meals, which included drinks, appetizers,
 main entrée and dessert averaged from \$70 to \$100. [] also recalled Boal
 ordering room service for them at least once, which included drinks, appetizers and
 food. [] stated that she, [] and Boal also met for dinner at Citronelle once
 possibly the third week of June.

(b)(1) [] Boal always paid, [] stated. (b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct [] explained that [] participated in the meals and did not pay. (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(6) [] advised that she took OPA's lead. (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c) (b)(7)(c)

14. (S//NF) [] stated that the conversation topics she shared with Boal
 and Bigelow during meetings included how the UBL operation team got from point A to
 point B.

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

INTERVIEWEE: [REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)Tahitian Pearl Earrings

16. (C) [REDACTED] stated that her first introduction to Bigelow was over the phone in Boal's hotel suite at The Jefferson. [REDACTED] stated that Boal convinced her to talk to Bigelow who was shooting a Chanel commercial in Tahiti. Bigelow wanted to thank her for taking part in the UBL movie project. [REDACTED] stated.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

17. (C) [REDACTED] stated that when she and [REDACTED] met with Boal and Bigelow at the Georgetown Ritz-Carlton hotel in July 2011 for an official meeting, Bigelow passed her the black Tahitian pearl earrings and said she wanted her [REDACTED] to have the small gift. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] saw Bigelow give her the earrings and said nothing.

(b)(3) CIAAct
Social Contact

18. (C) [REDACTED] recalled having three social contacts with Boal and Bigelow without OPA being present. [REDACTED] stated she liked Boal and Bigelow and had developed a friendship with them over time. The first social contact was in July 2011 a day after she and [REDACTED] met with Boal and Bigelow at the Georgetown Ritz-Carlton hotel. [REDACTED] stated that she, Boal, and Bigelow had drinks at the Ritz. The second social contact was in Los Angeles in August 2011, [REDACTED] stated. [REDACTED] advised that

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

6

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

INTERVIEWEE: (b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

while on vacation in Los Angeles (b)(7)(c) she met Boal and Bigelow for dinner at the Soho House on Sunset Boulevard in West Hollywood, Los Angeles. (b)(7)(c) explained that before she left for Los Angeles, she asked her boss, (b)(7)(c) if it was okay to contact Boal and Bigelow and inform them of her plans to be in Los Angeles and meet them for dinner. (b)(7)(c) did not voice any problems with it and said for her to tell them hello. (b)(7)(c) recalled. (b)(7)(c) advised that Bigelow paid for her \$40 or \$50 meal. (b)(7)(c) mentioned that she gave Bigelow a mini Burka and a publicly available poster of Bin Laden that had "Deceased" written across it. (b)(7)(c) stated that Bigelow offered to have a screening of *Zero Dark Thirty* in a private room at the Soho House for her and her family when the movie opened. (b)(7)(c) noted that Bigelow has a membership at the Soho House. (b)(7)(c) stated that she checked with OPA officer (b)(7)(c) about Bigelow's offer and he said not to accept it. (b)(7)(c) stated this was her last meeting with Bigelow.

19. (S/NF) (b)(7)(c) advised that she had an official meeting with Boal in (b)(1) (b)(7)(c) in November 2011. (b)(7)(c) stated that Boal was (b)(1) heading to (b)(3) CIAAct Islamabad to film and wanted her to review the script. (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(7)(c) stated that (b)(7)(c) she (b)(5) contacted (b)(7)(c) about the script review meeting with Boal. (b)(7)(c) told her that he (b)(6) and (b)(7)(c) had already reviewed the script with Boal telephonically and had concerns (b)(7)(c) with the script's depiction of detainee debriefings. (b)(7)(c) explained that the debriefing scenes included dogs being in the room and detainees being punched and kicked.

(b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(5)
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

21. (G) (b)(7)(c) stated that her third social contact with Boal occurred the same day after she reviewed the script. (b)(7)(c) explained that she spent about eight hours shopping and dining with Boal. (b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

7

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(5)
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

(b)(1) ~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

INTERVIEWEE:

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

_____ after shopping. _____ advised that while shopping, with Boal, she saw something designed by Prada and commented that she liked the designer. Boal said he knew the designer personally and offered her tickets to a Prada fashion show. _____ stated. _____ advised that she did not think she could accept the tickets and declined Boal's offer. Boal also invited her to the *Zero Dark Thirty* screening and suggested she come to the set even if for a few minutes. _____ stated.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

22. (G) _____ advised that she also had non-work related e-mail contact with Bigelow and Boal via her personal e-mail account. _____ stated that she exchanged e-mails with Boal once every three weeks between September 2011 and January 2012.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

_____ advised that Boal _____ (b)(6) Her e-mail contact with Bigelow was less, approximately once every other month. _____ advised. _____ described the e-mail contacts as sharing casual pleasantries.

(b)(6)

_____ advised that she contacted (b)(7)(c) via e-mail after Boal knew she was going to be in Los Angeles in January 2012 and begged her to meet. _____ explained that she opted to contact (b)(6) via email instead of having a face-to-face meeting.

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

_____ while on vacation to communicate _____

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

_____ does not know her true name, or what she looks like. _____ advised. _____ stated that she exchanged e-mails three times between late January and early Feb 2012. _____ advised that she called _____ via her cell phone and blocked her number. _____ advised that she talked _____ for an hour.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

_____ asked to talk _____ advised.

_____ said to have _____ go through Boal who in turn should submit an official request via OPA requesting permission to meet _____ Boal did not submit the request to OPA to her knowledge. _____ stated.

23. (G) _____ stated that she last talked to Boal in May 2012 when she told him that she could no longer maintain contact with him. Boal said he understood but e-mailed another three clips from the set to her. _____ stated. _____ explained that Boal would send her updates from the movie set. _____ offered that Boal said that she could send the clips to spam or delete them.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct ~~SECRET/NOFORN~~
(b)(3) NatSecAct
INTERVIEWEE: (b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

INTERVIEWEE:

24. (G) [redacted] recalled that Boal presented her with a release form to sign at one of their meetings. Boal explained that a person who did not like how they were portrayed in the *Hurt Locker* sued him. [redacted] was present when she read the release, [redacted] noted.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

[redacted] advised that she [redacted] did not sign it.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

25. (G) [redacted] commented that she got free food and pearl earrings from Bigelow and free food from Boal. Boal or Bigelow paid for all of the meals except for the one [redacted] advised. [redacted] stated that [redacted] was present at all the meals except the three social meetings. [redacted] was present at the dinners with Boal and Bigelow and never offered to pay nor did [redacted] say they could not or should not accept meals from Boal and Bigelow. [redacted] stated that she relied on OPA for guidance. [redacted] stated there were times she claimed overtime for meeting with Boal and Bigelow after hours but she did not claim overtime for the script review. [redacted] advised that she did not claim overtime for social meetings with Boal and Bigelow. [redacted] stated that she asked [redacted] if she could claim overtime for the after hour meetings with Boal and Bigelow and either [redacted] said overtime was authorized and that she could charge overtime.

(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(1) (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

26. (G) [redacted] did not recall taking ethics training. [redacted] offered that any ethics training she may have taken should be documented in her Agency training record. [redacted] was adamant that she received no guidance from OPA, the Office of General Counsel (OGC) or the Office of Security regarding her official or personal meetings with Boal and Bigelow. [redacted] stated there were no procedures to follow regarding what she could discuss during the meetings with Boal and Bigelow. [redacted] also stated that she did not have contact with anyone else in the media except Boal and Bigelow. [redacted] added that she was unaware of any other media types' involvement with the UBL movie project.

27. (G) [redacted] was adamant that she proactively reported her contacts and meetings with Boal and Bigelow, [redacted] to [redacted] management, OPA, and [redacted] C. [redacted] stated that [redacted] internal and external meetings with Boal and Bigelow, [redacted] advised.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

[redacted] offered that the seventh floor approved the cooperation with the filmmakers Boal and Bigelow. Additionally, Boal and Bigelow were meeting with DD/CIA Morrell, so she assumed her meetings with Boal and Bigelow were okay.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct ~~SECRET/NOFORN~~
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

INTERVIEWEE:

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

Attachment:

As stated.

~~SECRET~~

23 August 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: (U) Appraisal of One Set of Black Tahitian Pearl Earrings

REFERENCE: (b)(3) CIAAct

1. (S) On 23 August 2012, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) Special Agents (b)(3) CIAAct obtained a signed Receipt for Property Received/Returned/Released/Seized form from (b)(3) CIAAct to have one set of small round black Tahitian Pearl post-backed earrings appraised as part of an OIG investigation into alleged gifts and gratuities.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(5)

3. (U) The jeweler looked at the earrings and determined they were painted, the posts were sterling silver, not platinum, and did not recommend they be sent to the laboratory for an in-depth appraisal analysis. The jeweler estimated the value to be no more than \$200 and stated if he was to sell them, he would ask between \$60 and \$70.

4. (C) The earrings were returned to (b)(3) CIAAct and she signed the Receipt for Property Received/Returned/Released/Seized form that the earrings had been returned to her.

(b)(3) CIAAct

Special Agent

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3)
NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

Attachments

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~








EXHIBIT B

Subj: (U) Potential Ethics Violations Involving Film Producers

(b)(3) CIAAct

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

11 September 2012

INTERVIEW REPORT

INTERVIEWEE: (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
PREPARED BY: (b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
CASE:

1. (C) On 11 September 2012, Office of Inspector General (OIG), Investigative Staff, Special Agents (b)(3) CIAAct interviewed (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
regarding gifts and gratuities from outside sources in connection (b)(6)
with the movie production about Usama Bin Laden (UBL) titled *Zero Dark Thirty*. (b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

3. (C) (b)(3) CIAAct indicated that his first meeting with the filmmakers occurred (b)(1)
(b)(5) however, he could not recall the exact date. (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6) related that his first meeting was at a hotel restaurant/bar in Georgetown, Washington, (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(c) D.C. explained (b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

INTERVIEWEE: [REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

there were no restrictions. At this meeting were [REDACTED] and Boal. [REDACTED] explained that a meal was provided and consumed by all parties. [REDACTED] was not sure who paid for this meal, which he approximated his portion to cost \$50 to \$70; however, he did not pay for his meal.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1)

4. (C) [REDACTED] stated that his second meeting with the filmmakers occurred at Bistro Dupont, Washington, D.C.. [REDACTED] indicated that he could not recall the exact date, but that [REDACTED] and Boal were present during the meeting. At the restaurant a meal was provided and consumed by all parties. [REDACTED] approximated his portion of this meal to cost approximately \$50. [REDACTED] stated that he did not know who paid for the meal, however, he did not pay.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

5. (C) [REDACTED] third meeting with the filmmakers occurred at the same Georgetown hotel restaurant/bar as the first meeting. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Boal, and Kathryn Bigelow were present at this meeting. Upon his arrival he consumed drinks and an appetizer. He approximated the value of his meal/drinks to be \$30, which [REDACTED] indicated Boal paid for.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

6. (C) [REDACTED] related that his final meeting with the filmmakers occurred while he was on vacation in Los Angeles, California. [REDACTED] (b)(7)(c) [REDACTED] While in Los Angeles, [REDACTED] initiated contact with Boal via his personal cell phone. They met at a restaurant in Hollywood where a meal was consumed for which Boal paid. [REDACTED] indicated that his meal cost approximately \$30, but [REDACTED] could not recall the name of the restaurant. After the meal, Boal and [REDACTED] drove to a beach house in Malibu, California. At the beach house, [REDACTED] and Boal met with Bigelow and another person, whose name [REDACTED] could not recall. [REDACTED] believed that this unknown person was a friend of Bigelow's from the Los Angeles art community. [REDACTED] stated that while at the beach house they relaxed and conversed. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[REDACTED] departed the same day, continuing his vacation to the San Francisco, California area. [REDACTED] indicated this was a planned vacation and he personally paid for all travel costs. None of the filmmakers accompanied [REDACTED] further on his vacation. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] was aware of his meeting with the filmmakers in Los Angeles.

(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c) Act
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

7. (C) [REDACTED] stated that after his final meeting with the filmmakers in Los Angeles, his communication was only with Boal and was limited to phone calls and e-mails. All phone calls and e-mails occurred using personal accounts. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] recalled that his last communication with Boal was February 2012.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

INTERVIEWEE:

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1) 8. (C) [] indicated that all meetings with the filmmakers where he was
 (b)(3) CIAAct present occurred outside of Headquarters. []

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6) At one of the meetings in
 (b)(7)(c) Washington, D.C., Boal presented [] with a bottle of tequila []

[] stated that when Boal gave him the bottle of tequila, Boal informed him that it was worth several hundred dollars; however, [] did not confirm this information. [] estimated the tequila to be between two and three hundred dollars. [] could not recall the brand of tequila, but that he consumed it with friends at a later date.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct he did not report either gift to Agency personnel. []

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

9. (C) In reference to the content of the discussions held where [] was present, he indicated that OPA did not provide any clear guidance as to what could or could not be discussed. [] provided that it was clear to him that it was voluntary as to whether he could meet with the filmmakers. [] further related that he was under the impression that the content of discussions should be to provide context to what the filmmakers were asking about, and that Agency employees should be "helpful," but that no clear "red lines" were provided by OPA. [] stated that among the CTC cadre they developed their own "red line" topics which they would not discuss or elaborate upon. [] indicated neither OPA or Office of General Counsel provided any guidance on what could or could not be discussed, nor guidance of reporting meetings with the filmmakers. [] provided that [] were aware of all his meetings with the filmmakers. [] stated he has not had ethics training. [] recalled a release form circulating from the film producers or their attorneys that [] was aware of, but he did not sign it.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3)

NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

10. (C) [] said that in meetings with Boal, he provided some background on history of the lead, described time periods, field experiences of a typical case officer, impact of the Khost attack on personnel in terms of morale and following efforts, the strategic view of the hunt for UBL and ongoing efforts to dismantle Al Q'aida, and the relationship with the US military in general on operations. In regard to meetings where Bigelow was present, [] stated that she seemed most interested in "what's it like in the field."

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**INTERVIEWEE:**

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

Special Agent

Attachments

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
Subject: additional clarification
To: (b)(3) CIAAct
Date: 09/26/2012 03:31 PM

This message is digitally signed.

History: This message has been replied to and forwarded.

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct i was able to find the tequila we discussed online. it prices at \$169.99 (that's the highest i saw for it).

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)sification: ~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(7)(c)

From: (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

Subject: Re: Clarification

To: (b)(3) CIAAct

Cc:

Date: 09/17/2012 02:33 PM

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

i don't know exactly but would estimate it's no more than \$300, somewhere between \$200 and \$300. That estimate is based on his comments to me when he gave it to me, not based on my verifying it.

(b)(3) CIAAct

09/17/2012 02:25:48 PM

From: (b)(3) CIAAct

To: (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(7)(c)

Date: 09/17/2012 02:25 PM

Subject: Clarification

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

Hi (b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

Quick question. How much was the bottle of tequila you received from Boal?

Thanks.

(b)(3) CIAAct

=====
Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~=====
Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(7)(c)

From:

(b)(3) CIAAct subject: release form query

(b)(6)

To: (b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(7)(c)

Cc:

Date: 09/11/2012 02:27 PM

This message is digitally signed.

History:

This message has been replied to.

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

per our phonecall just now regarding the release form, i recall a release form of some sort circulating around which i believe [redacted] was aware of, but that was from the movie people (or more likely their lawyers). i did not sign it, nor did i sign anything. please let me know if you have any further questions...

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(7)(c)

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXHIBIT C

Subj: (U) Potential Ethics Violations Involving Film Producers
(b)(3) CIAAct

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

31 August 2012

INTERVIEW REPORT

INTERVIEWEE:

PREPARED BY:

SUBJECT:

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

1. (E) On 31 August 2012, Office of Inspector General (OIG) Special Agents (b)(3) CIAAct interviewed (b)(3) CIAAct regarding the receipt of gifts and gratuities from outside sources in connection with a movie production about Usama Bin Laden (UBL) titled *Zero Dark Thirty*.

(b)(3)
CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

3. (E) (b)(3) CIAAct stated that he became involved with the Hollywood project (b)(3) CIAAct in June 2011.

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

INTERVIEWEE: [] (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

4. (C) [] advised that the authorization to support the UBL movie project came from the Director of Central Intelligence suite. [] stated that OPA's role in the movie project was to be present at meetings between the film producers and Agency officers. [] explained that Boal needed to talk to Agency officers as part of the project, and those officers were not to interact with the film producers without OPA being present.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct **INTERVIEWEE:** []

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

[] stated that many unclassified details about the UBL hunt were in the public domain, and if discussions ventured from the publically available information, CTC officers could pull back from the discussion.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

7. (C)

[] attended a second meeting with Boal, [] after work at a restaurant for dinner in Georgetown the last week in June or first week in July 2011. [] advised that he left after an hour and a half, but [] stayed. [] assumed that [] paid for his meal, and hers. [] stated that his understanding of the rules, as discussed with [] was that OPA pays for their meals when they meet with reporters. [] did not know who paid for [] meal. [] did not recall if OPA provided guidance to [] about meeting with Boal and Bigelow and that the filmmakers were not to pay for Agency employee meals. [] assumed [] provided guidance to []

(b)(3)

CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

8. (C) [] advised that he did not receive gifts or gratuities from the film producers.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)

9. (C)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(5)

[] noted that [] kept him info (b)(6) of her off campus meetings with Boal and Bigelow. [] recalled that [] (b)(7)(c) ned him about meeting with Boal [] for drinks and dinner. [] advised that he made sure [] submitted an OAR for her unofficial contact with Boal and Bigelow. [] initially submitted an OAR to report volunteer contact with the media, but OPA instructed [] to resubmit the OAR changing it from a volunteer contact to a media contact, [] advised.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

ad that months after [] officers contact with

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(6)
 INTERVIEWEE: (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(6)
 the film producers, (b)(7)(c) put a stop to CTC officers having further
 media contact.

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(5)
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

12. (S//NF) [redacted] related that Boal walked him and [redacted] through the *Zero Dark Thirty* script during four or five telephone conversations in September or October 2011. [redacted] offered that he checked the names in the script to ensure they were not close to true names. He and [redacted] also reviewed the script for egregious errors like having dogs in the interrogation scenes, [redacted] stated. [redacted] stated that he does not know where Boal obtained information about having dogs in an interrogation room. [redacted] advised that he and [redacted] told Boal that the depiction was inaccurate, that CIA would never have dogs in an interrogation room, and that OPA objected to the scenes. Boal advised that another inaccuracy with the script involved Agency officers partying and shooting guns. [redacted] told Boal that Agency officers would not do that. [redacted] stated that OPA did not have authority to approve the script, and he was not sure if requirements to preview the script existed. [redacted] advised that OPA would not receive a copy of the script.

(b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(5)
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

INTERVIEWEE:

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

14. (G) [redacted] stated that he was aware of the release form Boal wanted Agency officers participating in the UBL movie project to sign. [redacted] stated that he did not sign it.

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

Special Agent

Attachment:
As stated.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

VICE NEWS

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

VICTIM NEWS

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)




EXHIBIT D

Subj: (U) Potential Ethics Violations Involving Film Producers

(b)(3) CIAAct

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Office of Inspector General
Investigations Staff

Memorandum of Investigative Activity (MOIA)

Case No.: (b)(3) CIAAct Case Title: Alleged Illegal Gratuities
Investigator: [redacted] Activity: Interview Report
Date of Activity: 19 March 2013 Date Prepared: 19 April 2013
Location: (b)(3) CIAAct
MOIA prepared by: (b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

1. (U//FOUO) On 19 March 2013, Office of Inspector General (OIG)

[redacted] regarding her knowledge of [redacted] employees
who participated in the CIA's Usama bin Laden (UBL) movie project in June 2011 for the movie *Zero Dark Thirty* receiving gifts and gratuities from scriptwriter Mark Boal and movie producer, Kathryn Bigelow.

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

3. (U//FOUO)

[redacted] recalled that [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct
[redacted] said the decision for OPA to participate in Boal and Bigelow's UBL movie project came from the (b)(6)
Director of Central Intelligence's (D/CIA) office. (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

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Page 1 of 4

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum of Investigative Activity (MOIA)

(b)(3) CIAAct (U//FOUO) [] said that CTC officers meetings with Boal and Bigelow were voluntary.
 (b)(6) [] and that an OPA official would attend the
 (b)(7)(c) eting. [] advised that classified information was not disclosed to Boal and Bigelow. [] said that
 (b)(3) CIAAct []
 (b)(6) [] said Boal and Bigelow received tours of CTC spaces and that she was present when Bigelow visited
 (b)(7)(c) [] building at CIA. The building had already been returned to its pre UBL war
 room condition, [] advised.

5. (U//FOUO)

(b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(5)
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

[] advised that some meetings were eventually held
 off campus at the direction of OPA leadership from mid-July to maybe August 2011. [] related that
 [] made the decision for certain [] officers to meet off
 campus with the producers, [] said. [] advised that jealousy in CTC over who was getting "face
 time" with the producers led OPA to move the meetings off campus.

meetings off CIA Campus

6. (U//FOUO)

[] The first
 meeting was held in Boal's hotel suite at the Jefferson Hotel, in Washington D.C. [] recalled this
 meeting occurred in July 2011. [] had lunch served in
 Boal's room. [] recalled ordering a grilled cheese, French fries, and soda. []

7. A second meeting off campus with [] Boal and Bigelow was held at the Ritz-Carleton
 hotel in Georgetown during 14-17 July 2011 when Bigelow was in town. [] recalled having tomato
 soup at that meeting. [] said that both meetings occurred over the weekend, during the day at lunch
 time and each meeting ran four or five hours.

8. (U//FOUO) (b)(3) CIAAct []
 [] had a third meeting at the French restaurant, Bistro du Coin, during the week
 with Boal, [] (b)(6) [] It was a getting to know you meeting, which was not
 unusual, [] (b)(7)(c) [] said she paid for her and [] meal with her personal credit card. []
 maintained that she shreds her credit card receipts and no longer has any from 2011.

(b)(3) CIAAct (U//FOUO) [] referred to [] met with Boal
 and Bigelow at CIA Headquarters (HQS). [] said during his OIG interview on 31 August 2012 that []
 [] attended the meal at a restaurant in Georgetown with [] During his 11 September
 2012 interview with the OIG, [] said that he attended a meeting with [] and [] at Bistro Dupont, in
 Washington, DC.

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CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**Memorandum of Investigative Activity (MOIA)**

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

9. (C) [] said that she, [] Boal, and Bigelow had dinner at Citronelle restaurant in Georgetown. [] said that she did not pay for this meal and that either Boal or Bigelow paid for the meal. She did not recall the exact amount but guessed that her share of meal was approximately \$125.00. [] described the Citronelle meal as more social than work related. [] explained that she, [] and Boal had spent most of the day discussing topics related to the UBL movie. At the end of the long day, someone suggested going for a bite to eat. There were no substantive discussions held during the meal at Citronelle. [] advised.

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(5)

(b)(7)(c)

10. (C) [] recalled having dinner at the Jefferson Hotel's restaurant, Plume with Boal and [] on another occasion. Boal was staying at the Jefferson. [] explained. [] said she did not pay and assumed the meal was charged to Boal's hotel room. [] advised that the price of her meal at Plume was similar but maybe slightly less than her meal at Citronelle.

11. (U//FOUO) [] said that she did not provide guidance to the CTC officers participating in UBL project about accepting meals from Boal and Bigelow. She does not recall anyone asking her if it was acceptable to accept the meals. [] said that she never had discussions about who would pick up the tab for social dinners. []

[] said that she was not aware of anyone accepting gifts from Boal or Bigelow to include jewelry or alcohol. [] said that she did not see a copy of the script and was not offered tickets to the movie.

12. (U//FOUO) [] also said that she would not have offered guidance or advice to the CTC officers about having unofficial contact with the media and the requirement to complete an Outside Activity Request forms (879). [] explained that movie producers are not reporters. [] offered that OPA considers representatives from Hollywood to be distinct from media representatives since they have different missions. According to [] media representatives report factual information, whereas Hollywood representatives weave stories containing some fictional elements around factual events. [] offered that she did not consider Boal and Bigelow reporters.

13. (U//FOUO) [] said that she did not have concerns about the off campus meetings with the producers or with the information discussed during the meetings. [] offered that the off campus meetings were quieter and the purpose was to obtain unclassified information to develop the female actor's character, and talk through issues. [] also said that she never sought guidance from the Office of General Counsel (OGC) about meeting with the producers. [] explained that none of the participants on or off campus ever expressed concerns to her about meeting with the producers or the topics discussed. [] offered that it was not unusual for undercover officers to meet with reporters. [] said that [] the producers wanted the UBL participants to sign Non Disclosure Agreements (NDA).

[]

² (U//FOUO) [] referred to the release form Boal wanted Agency employees to sign as a Non Disclosure Agreement (NDA); however, it was a release form and not a NDA.

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**Memorandum of Investigative Activity (MOIA)**

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

15. (U//~~FOUO~~) [] offered that [] she realized that she had not paid for some meals. To rectify the situation, [] believes that she wrote to Boal and Bigelow's production company in California and made a good faith effort to repay the money by mailing a check for \$500.00. [] explained that she called Boal and asked him how much he paid for her meals during the UBL movie project. [] said that she and Boal agreed that \$500.00 was a fair value. [] said that when the OIG contacted her for the interview, she searched for the duplicate check and evidence that it had been cashed but could not find either.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

16. (U//~~FOUO~~) [] said she not submit a voucher to be reimbursed for meals she paid for during official meetings with Boal. [] advised that it was not unusual for [] to pay for meals consumed during an official meeting using their personal credit cards, and not seek reimbursement [] did not recall if overtime was authorized for the external meetings held outside normal business hours. She did not recall anyone asking if overtime was authorized and did not recall submitting a request for overtime.

(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

Attachments

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SECRET***Timeline of Interaction with Bin Ladin Film***

April 2010 – D/CIA Panetta and film director Kathryn Bigelow meet at an event where she discusses her film project; DCIA offers Agency assistance.

Early Spring 2011 (In March or April, before the raid) – Michael Feldman, the film's public relations representative, contacted DCIA's Chief of Staff, Jeremy Bash, to renew the request for assistance.

Early May 2011 – Feldman again reaches out to Bash, who refers him to Office of Public Affairs.

10 May 2011 – Director OPA receives a letter from the filmmakers requesting a phone call to discuss the movie project.

17 May 2011 – Conference call between Office of Public Affairs officers, the film's screenwriter, Mark Boal, and Bigelow.

20 May 2011 – Meeting between Feldman, Boal, Director of the Office of Public Affairs, and Bash.

Week of 6 June 2011 – Meetings between Boal, Bash, DD/CIA, and officers involved in the hunt for Bin Ladin.

--Chief of Staff Jeremy Bash

--DD/CIA Michael Morell

--Chief of CTC

(b)(1)

--

(b)(3) CIAAct

--Deputy Chief of CTC

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Week of 24 June 2011 – Meetings between Boal and CTC officers; Boal attends UBL Ceremony (attended by (b)(1) who received a standing ovation from the crowd).

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Week of 11 July 2011 – Meetings between Boal, Bigelow, AD/CIA and CTC officers.

–AD/CIA Michael Morell

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

26 October, 1 November, 18 November, 5 December 2011– Boal reads his script over the telephone to OPA officers so that OPA could determine if the script inadvertently exposed any sensitivities.

4 January 2012 – Telephone conversation with Boal in which he asks about the possibility of filming at the Agency.

10 February 2012 – OPA meets with DD CIA, ADD CIA, and DD CIA Chief of Staff to discuss filmmakers' request to film on the Agency compound.

16 February 2012 – (b)(6) from the Virginia Film Office, and Colleen Gibbons, the film's location manager, tour Agency and meet with Public Affairs officers.

17 February 2012 – DD CIA concurs in principle (with DCIA concurrence) with allowing UBL filmmakers to film under the same strict parameters used with other productions.

21 February 2012 – OPA informs filmmakers that their request to film has been approved, in the same locations and under the same conditions as previous films.

9 April 2012 – OPA officers—including an authorized Agency photographer—escort Gibbons to locations in Headquarters where filming has previously been allowed (the OHB lobby, upper OHB lobby, Director's Gallery, etc) and take unclassified photos. Photos are reviewed by security and subsequently passed to Gibbons the next week.

17 April 2012 – Gibbons and OPA officers meet with security to begin discussions about logistics of filming.

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(b)(3) CIAAct

3 May 2012 – OPA Officer [] receives a call from the film's producers indicating the need to delay filming at headquarters until late summer or early fall.

VICTIM NEWS

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VICT NEWS

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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VICE NEWS

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)

VICE NEWS

(b)(1)
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VICE NEWS

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VICE NEWS

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VICE NEWS

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
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EXHIBIT E

Subj: (U) Potential Ethics Violations Involving Film Producers
(b)(3) CIAAct

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(b)(3) CIAAct
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
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(b)(7)(d)

EXHIBIT F

Subj: (U) Potential Ethics Violations Involving Film Producers

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
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(b)(7)(d)

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(b)(3) CIAAct
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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~*Central Intelligence Agency
Inspector General***REPORT OF INVESTIGATION**

(U) Alleged Disclosure of Classified Information by Former D/CIA
(b)(3) CIAAct

12 March 2014

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**(U) Section I - Proddication**

1. (U//FOUO) On 9 October 2012, the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD/OIG) notified the CIA Office of Inspector General (OIG) via memorandum (Exhibit A) that allegedly, then Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta, while serving as the Director of CIA (DCIA), disclosed classified information to an uncleared person, specifically Hollywood film producer and screenwriter Mark Boal.¹ According to the DoD/OIG notification, the incident stemmed from a 24 June 2011, speech given by former DCIA (F/DCIA) Panetta at a CIA Osama Bin Laden (UBL) Operation Awards Ceremony, held on CIA Headquarters grounds, which Boal attended.²

2. (U//FOUO) DoD/OIG also informed OIG that F/DCIA Panetta's speech was incorrectly classified. DoD/OIG provided documentation from the Original Classification Authorities (OCA) illustrating that F/DCIA Panetta's speech, classified by the CIA as SECRET, contained DoD derived TOP SECRET information at the Sensitive Compartmented Level (TS/SCI).

3. (U//FOUO) On 9 October 2012, CIA OIG initiated an investigation into this matter. The focus of the investigation centered on the following related questions:

- (U//FOUO) Question #1: Did F/DCIA Panetta disclose classified information during the UBL Operation Awards Ceremony to Mark Boal, an uncleared person?
- (U//FOUO) Question #2: Prior to the ceremony, did F/DCIA Panetta know that Mark Boal was invited or that Boal would be in attendance?
- (U//FOUO) Question #3: What was the origin of the misclassification of F/DCIA Panetta's speech for the UBL Operation Awards Ceremony?

(U) Section II - Potential Statutory or Regulatory Violations

- (U) Federal criminal law, Title 18 U.S.C. § 793(d), Gathering, transmitting or losing defense information.
- (U) Federal criminal law, Title 18 U.S.C. § 798, Disclosure of classified information.

• (b)(3) CIAAct

¹ (U) F/DCIA Panetta served as DCIA from 13 February 2009 to 30 June 2011. Upon ending his tenure as DCIA, Panetta served as the Secretary of Defense from 1 July 2011 to 27 February 2013.

² (U//FOUO) The UBL Operation Awards Ceremony commemorated the collaborative effort spearheaded by the CIA in cooperation with multiple agencies, including National Security Agency (NSA) and DoD. The operation came to a head on 2 May 2011, when operators from (b)(3) NatSecAct conducted a raid on a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan where UBL was suspected of hiding.

OIG Case No. (b)(3) CIAAct

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(b)(3) CIAAct

(U) Section III - Background

4. (U) In June 2011, a month after the successful 2 May 2011, raid on UBL's Abbottabad compound, CIA provided Mark Boal, who did not have a security clearance, access to Agency facilities and personnel to further his research for a screenplay, later released under the title "Zero Dark Thirty," based on the events that led to the UBL raid. As part of that access, Boal was invited to the classified UBL Operation Awards Ceremony.

5. (S//NF) On 24 June 2011, F/DCIA Panetta presided over the UBL Operation Awards Ceremony at CIA Headquarters, commemorating both the successful 2 May 2011 raid, as well as the many years of collaborative effort leading up to it. The classified ceremony was held inside a large tent erected outside CIA's Original Headquarters Building (OHB) main entrance and attended by approximately 1300 people. The audience was a mixture of both overt and covert personnel from across the Intelligence Community (IC), as well as personnel from DoD and Congress.³ (b)(1) who conducted the raid, were also in attendance.

(b)(3) NatSecAct
(U) Section IV - Investigative Findings

(U) Executive Summary of Investigative Findings

6. (U//FOUO) The investigation by OIG determined that F/DCIA Panetta disclosed classified information to an uncleared person, specifically Mark Boal. F/DCIA Panetta told OIG he was not aware that any uncleared persons, to include Boal, were in attendance at the classified ceremony. OIG's investigation obtained conflicting information as to whether F/DCIA Panetta had knowledge Boal was in the audience at the time of the speech. While both F/DCIA Panetta and (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c) that F/DCIA Panetta was not aware Boal would be at the ceremony,

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c) that F/DCIA Panetta did know Boal would be at the event. Regarding F/DCIA Panetta's speech, it was written, classified SECRET, and coordinated by the Agency's Office of Public Affairs (OPA) with the exception of several handwritten remarks made by F/DCIA Panetta. OIG found that the discrepancy in the classification of the speech was due to the fact that

(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c) did not coordinate the information in the speech with outside agencies beforehand. While the OIG investigation determined several senior CIA officers were aware Boal would be attending the UBL Operation Awards Ceremony, OIG was unable to ascertain who specifically authorized Boal's invitation. This matter was referred to the Department of Justice, which declined prosecution in favor of administrative action.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

³ A copy of the press release issued by OPA for the UBL Operation Awards Ceremony is included with this report as Exhibit B.

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(U//FOUO) Question #1: Did F/DCIA Panetta disclose classified information during the UBL Operation Awards Ceremony to Mark Boal, an uncleared person?

7. (U//FOUO) The investigation by OIG determined F/DCIA Panetta disclosed classified information during his speech at the 24 June 2011 UBL Operation Awards Ceremony, and that Boal was in attendance during the speech. F/DCIA Panetta told OIG he was aware the speech contained classified information; however he was not aware that Boal was in the audience at the ceremony.

8. (U//FOUO) During the course of the investigation, OIG found that [redacted] were aware the UBL Operation Awards Ceremony was classified, and that Boal attended the event, and did not have a security clearance.

- (U//FOUO) [redacted] recalled being advised of Boal's invitation to the ceremony from OPA several days before the event. [redacted] could not recall any further information regarding Boal's invitation. [redacted] told OIG he did not object to Boal's invitation. He stated it never occurred to him that Boal's presence at the ceremony would pose a security problem.

- (U//FOUO) [redacted] declined to be interviewed by OIG. Through the course of the investigation, OIG learned from [redacted] informed [redacted] that Boal was attending the ceremony beforehand and warned [redacted] that Boal would be exposed to classified information contained in F/DCIA Panetta's speech. Additionally, [redacted]

[redacted] as well as instructed her to invite Boal to the UBL Operation Awards Ceremony.

- (U//FOUO) [redacted] was aware the Director's speech was classified. [redacted] also knew Boal would be attending the event but could not recall if she learned of it the day of the event, or several days beforehand [redacted]

- (S//NF) [redacted] was aware the ceremony was classified and that Boal would be attending. [redacted] first confronted [redacted] several days before the event about Boal attending. According to [redacted] objected to Boal's attendance because it was a closed event. F/DCIA Panetta's speech was classified [redacted]

[redacted] tried other means to minimize [redacted] Boal's attendance would have.

[redacted] would be jeopardized by Boal's attendance [redacted]

Additionally, [redacted] informed [redacted] of these same concerns several days before the ceremony.

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6) [redacted] asked [redacted] for assistance in warning F/DCIA Panetta that
(b)(7)(c) Boal, an uncleared person, would be in the audience.

- (U//FOUO) [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct
[redacted] (b)(7)(c) was not aware the UBL
Operation Awards Ceremony was classified, [redacted] did know F/DCIA Panetta's speech
was classified. [redacted] to review with Boal guidelines
for his attendance at the ceremony.

(U//FOUO) Question #2: Prior to the ceremony, did F/DCIA Panetta know that Mark Boal was
invited or that Boal would be in attendance?

9. (U//FOUO) Due to conflicting information obtained by OIG through the course of the
investigation, no determination could be made as to whether F/DCIA Panetta knew Boal was
invited to or attended the UBL Operation Awards Ceremony. F/DCIA Panetta told OIG he had
no knowledge of Boal's invitation to the ceremony. F/DCIA Panetta explained to OIG that he
never met Boal and, therefore, would not be able to identify him.

(b)(3) CIAAct
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(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

10. (U//FOUO) [redacted] gave a differing account to OIG, stating that [redacted] in a phone
call subsequent to the event that F/DCIA Panetta had foreknowledge of Boal attending the
ceremony. A review of Agency records by OIG, found information suggesting that F/DCIA
Panetta may have met Boal in May of 2010. OIG reviewed F/DCIA Panetta's briefing materials
for the 1 May 2010, White House Correspondents' Association Dinner (Exhibit C), which
indicated F/DCIA Panetta sat at the same table as Boal for the event. Additionally, a 21 April
2011 email (Exhibit D) from [redacted] to [redacted] referenced a dinner conversation between Boal and
F/DCIA Panetta from the approximate time of the 01 May 2010 event.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

11. (U//FOUO) The investigation found no information that affirmatively identified who
authorized Boal's invitation to the UBL Operation Awards Ceremony.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

- (U//FOUO) According to [redacted] Boal became aware of the ceremony several days
prior from unidentified officers assigned to the Agency's Counterterrorism Center
(CTC). [redacted] said that Boal expressed an interest in attending the ceremony and [redacted]
passed his request to [redacted] for action. According to [redacted] that the
Office of the DCIA approved the invitation to Boal. [redacted] did not recall [redacted]
identifying who from the Office of the DCIA provided the approval.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

- (U//FOUO) [redacted] informed [redacted] about [redacted] concerns
regarding Boal's exposure to classified information at the event. [redacted] said
[redacted] was present when [redacted] received a telephone call from a person [redacted] believed was
[redacted] directing that Boal be invited to the ceremony.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

- (U//FOUO) In an interview with OIG, [redacted] denied inviting Boal to the ceremony or
directing anyone to extend an invitation to Boal. According to [redacted], several days
before the ceremony, OPA informed him of their intention to invite Boal to the

OIG Case 1 (b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) CIAAct⁵
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

ceremony in order to assist the screenwriter in capturing the atmospherics of the event. [] recalled having no objections.

(b)(1) (U//FOUO) Question #3: What were the origins of the misclassification of F/DCIA Panetta's
(b)(3) NatSecAct speech for the UBL Operation Awards Ceremony?

12. (S//NF) OIG's investigation revealed that, with the exception of F/DCIA Panetta writing in [] which was classified by the Joint Staff OCA as (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(1) SECRET/ [] Portions of the (b)(6)
(b)(3) NatSecAct speech authored by [] included information deemed by the NSA's OCA as NSA derived (b)(7)(c)
[] In his interview with OIG, [] stated that he classified the speech SECRET based on information he received from the Agency's Counterterrorism Center (CTC). [] told OIG that CTC notified him of the need to coordinate the information with NSA and DoD. However, [] said that he elected not to coordinate the information due to the press of business at the time and that there was no requirement by OPA that speeches be coordinated ahead of time with outside agencies.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(U) Section V – Investigative Activity

13. (U//FOUO) OIG interviewed [] (b)(7)(c) including F/DCIA Panetta. In addition to interviews, OIG reviewed relevant DoD and Agency records. OIG did not interview Boal as part of this investigation.

(b)(6)

14. (U//FOUO) OIG contacted [] (b)(7)(c)

[] OIG contacted [] again, after he left government service, []

(U//FOUO) Question #1: Did F/DCIA Panetta disclose classified information during the UBL Operation Awards Ceremony to Mark Boal, an uncleared person?

15. (U//FOUO) F/DCIA Panetta told OIG he was not aware the speech was classified. He later acknowledged that the speech contained information classified at the SECRET level. F/DCIA Panetta said he was also aware that the details of the speech had already appeared in numerous media outlets before the day of the ceremony. F/DCIA Panetta said that immediately after the 2 May 2011 operation, government officials, to include the President, began releasing details of the operation. F/DCIA Panetta stated the presence of information in such a manner contributed to a confusing situation with respect to what information was officially released and what was not.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

16. (U//FOUO) According to [] the speech was a standard thank you to those who participated in the UBL operation. [] provided OIG with a copy of a memorandum he provided to the Acting DoD Inspector General on 5 June 2013. A later review of the memorandum showed it to be consistent with statements made by [] providing no additional information for the investigation.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

17. (U//FOUO) [] was not involved in the drafting of F/DCIA Panetta's speech. According to [] a significant portion of the information addressed in the speech

OIG Case I (b)(3) CIAAct

6

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(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

was already in the public domain. In (b)(7)(c) opinion, F/DCIA Panetta might not have made the distinction between information that was still classified and information that was already effectively released to the public.

18. (U//FOUO) [] stated that she did not recall if the award ceremony was classified. [] said she believed that the Office of the DCIA was aware the speech was classified and that Boal would be attending the ceremony. [] did not identify who in the DCIA's Office she was referring to. Further, [] told OIG she was not aware of anyone in the DCIA's Office raising any objections.

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

19. (U//FOUO) [] stated that she was aware the speech was classified. (b)(7)(c) F/DCIA Panetta's tendency to ad-lib from the written speech as it was prepared by OPA.

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(U//FOUO) Question #2: Prior to the ceremony, did F/DCIA Panetta know that Mark Boal was invited or that Boal would be in attendance?

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

20. (U//FOUO) F/DCIA Panetta stated he did not know Boal would be at the ceremony. F/DCIA Panetta explained to OIG that he did not learn of Boal's attendance until he was told [] after becoming the Secretary of Defense. F/DCIA Panetta said he never met Boal and would not be able to recognize him. In F/DCIA Panetta's opinion, OPA was responsible for handling the ceremony and should have advised him that Boal would be in attendance.

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

21. (U//FOUO) According to [] F/DCIA Panetta was aware that Boal would be attending the awards ceremony. [] became aware of this after the ceremony and F/DCIA Panetta's departure from the Agency to serve as Secretary of Defense, circa August 2011. At the time, []

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

[] explained that CIA had just received a letter from Congressman Peter King requesting the Agency address concerns regarding alleged CIA involvement with the producers of the movie *Zero Dark Thirty*. In preparing CIA's response, Morell asked [] to contact [] during their telephone conversation that F/DCIA Panetta was aware that Boal would be at the ceremony.

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

22. (U//FOUO) [] was aware of Boal's invitation because OPA worked with [], and possibly F/DCIA Panetta, to set up the UBL Operation Awards Ceremony. For this same reason, [] assumed that OPA was directed to invite Boal. According to [] was aware of Boal's attendance and []

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct [] explained F/DCIA Panetta prioritized events, such as the UBL Operation Awards Ceremony, wanting nothing done without his approval. [] never met Boal, although [] call from him on one occasion when he was looking for [] would be surprised if F/DCIA Panetta did not know that Boal would be attending the ceremony.

(b)(6)

(b)(3) CIAAct (S//NF) [] could not recall exactly [] learned about Boal's

(b)(6) invitation to the ceremony (b)(7)(c) [] it could have been during a conversation with []

(b)(7)(c)

OIG Case (b)(3) CIAAct

7

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SECRET//NOFORN

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(1)

who was alarmed that Boal would be exposed

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

concerns. [redacted] told OIG (b)(7)(c) becoming aware of the matter when [redacted]

(b)(6)

approach (b)(7)(c) [redacted] [redacted] F/DCIA Panetta, who had

(b)(7)(c)

already begun to make their way to the ceremony location. [redacted]

was concerned

(b)(3) CIAAct

that Boal was in the audience [redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(6)

[redacted] in his speech. [redacted]

immediately contact the

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(7)(c)

Office of Protocol (OP) and have them contact their officer escorting F/DCIA Panetta. [redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(7)(c) [redacted] did not go to the ceremony and was, therefore, not aware if [redacted] was

(b)(6)

able to advise F/DCIA Panetta (b)(7)(c) [redacted] that other than [redacted] no one expressed any

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6)

concerns [redacted] about either Boal's attendance at the ceremony or his possible exposure to

(b)(7)(c)

classified information. [redacted] did not know if Boal's exposure to classified information

was ever reported to a security official.

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

24. (U//FOUO) [redacted] a day or two before the ceremony [redacted] told

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(7)(c)

[redacted] that [redacted] wanted Boal at the ceremony [redacted]

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6)

[redacted] despite [redacted] objections, [redacted] designated [redacted] as Boal's POC and

(b)(7)(c)

instructed [redacted] to invite Boal to the ceremony. [redacted] noted the interaction was not

memorialized in writing.

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

25. (S//NF) According to [redacted] around the same time as [redacted] meeting with [redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(7)(c)

[redacted] learned from [redacted] that F/DCIA Panetta intended to mention [redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] in his speech. [redacted]

(b)(1)

[redacted] asked [redacted] to persuade F/DCIA Panetta to

[redacted] did

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

[redacted] not know if [redacted] ever acted on [redacted] request. [redacted] said that, as an additional

(b)(7)(c)

precautionary measure, [redacted]

(b)(6)

(b)(1)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

26. (S//NF) [redacted] told OIG that on the day of the ceremony, [redacted] met with Boal and discussed the restrictions of Boal's attendance at the ceremony. [redacted] recalled

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] explained that Boal was there strictly for the event's atmospherics and was not permitted to retain, or in any way disclose anything he heard there

[redacted] According to [redacted] Boal indicated he understood and agreed to the stipulations.

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3)

CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

27. (S//NF) [redacted]

[redacted] and when it concluded, [redacted] motioned Boal to the front of the audience. [redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct

[redacted] noted the front area of

(b)(6)

the tent was where the principals [redacted]

(b)(7)(c)

congregated. [redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

28. (U//FOUO) While [redacted] did not know if then Deputy Director Morell or F/DCIA Panetta were aware of Boal's invitation, it was [redacted] impression that [redacted] and/or F/DCIA Panetta wanted Boal's attendance downplayed. [redacted] offered no

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

OIG Case N (b)(3) CIAAct

8

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~~SECRET~~(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

corroborating evidence to these statements and stressed that no one personally informed ^{(b)(7)(c)} to keep Boal's presence quiet. Additionally, ^{(b)(7)(c)} did not report Boal's exposure to classified information and ^{(b)(7)(c)} was not aware of anyone else doing so.

29. (U//FOUO) ^{(b)(7)(c)} told OIG that Boal first learned of the awards ceremony approximately two days before the event, when Boal was meeting with several CTC officers. ^{(b)(7)(c)} said that Boal asked her if he could attend the ceremony. This request was relayed to ^{(b)(3) CIAAct} who ^{(b)(6)} ultimately told her that the Office of the D/CIA approved Boal's attendance. ^{(b)(7)(c)} said that she did not know who specifically made the decision to invite Boal to the ceremony.

30. (U//FOUO) ^{(b)(3) CIAAct} ^{(b)(6)} ^{(b)(7)(c)} Prior to entering the tent, ^{(b)(6)} told Boal that everything he heard at the ceremony should be considered as 'off-the-record.' ^{(b)(7)(c)} gave Boal this guidance based on instructions ^{(b)(6)} received from ^{(b)(7)(c)}

31. (S//NF) ^{(b)(3) CIAAct} ^{(b)(6)} ^{(b)(7)(c)} where they situated themselves along the tent's left side (facing the podium). ^{(b)(6)} said that while they waited, several CIA officers, who had already consulted with Boal, approached and exchanged greetings with him. ^{(b)(7)(c)} could not recall the names of these officers. According to ^{(b)(3) CIAAct} Boal was invited down to the podium area following the ceremony. ^{(b)(6)} did not recall who invited Boal to the podium area, but that it may have been one of the CTC officers. ^{(b)(7)(c)} remembered that either ^{(b)(3) CIAAct} the CTC officers working with Boal may have introduced him to Vice Admiral William McRaven, ^{(b)(6)} ^{(b)(7)(c)} did not recall if ^{(b)(3) CIAAct} or F/D CIA ^{(b)(6)} ^{(b)(7)(c)} saw Boal at the ceremony. ^{(b)(7)(c)} could not remember if Boal came into CIA Headquarters for additional meetings before or after the ceremony, but thought he departed the Headquarters compound immediately afterwards. ^{(b)(3) CIAAct} said ^{(b)(6)} one of ^{(b)(7)(c)} may have accompanied ^{(b)(7)(c)} that day ^{(b)(6)} recalled seeing the two men conversing there. ^{(b)(7)(c)}

32. (U//FOUO) ^{(b)(3) CIAAct} ^{(b)(6)} ^{(b)(7)(c)} said he knew the ceremony was closed to the public, although he did not recall if the ceremony was classified. ^{(b)(6)} said he was not aware if Boal received any guidance regarding his attendance at the ceremony. ^{(b)(7)(c)}

33. (U//FOUO) ^{(b)(3) CIAAct} ^{(b)(6)} ^{(b)(7)(c)} recalled that, on the day of the ceremony, ^{(b)(3) CIAAct} only ^{(b)(6)} instructions were that ^{(b)(7)(c)} believed the purpose of Boal's attendance was to experience the atmospherics of the event, which was a continuation of his earlier meetings that were all "blessed" by senior CIA officials. ^{(b)(7)(c)} said that since the Office of the DCIA did not object to those meetings, he assumed there were no concerns with Boal attending the ceremony.

34. (S//NF) ^{(b)(3) CIAAct} ^{(b)(6)} ^{(b)(7)(c)} Boal initially stood at the rear of the tent, but shortly before the ceremony began, ^{(b)(7)(c)} suggested they move down to the front for a better view. ^{(b)(7)(c)} recalled they all moved to a vantage point along the left side towards the front of the tent. After the event concluded, an officer assigned to CTC introduced Boal ^{(b)(7)(c)}

OIG Case N(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] congregating near the podium. [redacted] stated Boal may have also met Vice Admiral McRaven at that time. [redacted] estimated they remained there approximately fifteen minutes following the ceremony.

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

35. (U//FOUO) [redacted] approached Boal, exchanged greetings and talked with him for a couple of minutes. While he was not privy to the conversation, [redacted] said that it did not appear to him that [redacted] was surprised to see Boal there. Based on [redacted] reaction, [redacted] said he surmised that [redacted] knew Boal would be attending. [redacted] stated [redacted] soon after departed the event with F/DCIA Panetta.

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

36. (U//FOUO) [redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(7)(c)

37. (U//FOUO) [redacted] F/DCIA Panetta first met Kathryn Bigelow, Boal's co-producer, around April 2010 at a dinner in Washington which [redacted] According to [redacted] Bigelow informed F/DCIA Panetta she was working on a movie project about the battle at Tora Bora. [redacted] recalled that F/DCIA Panetta told Bigelow [redacted]. As a result, later that Spring [redacted] received a telephone call from [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

[redacted] also remembered receiving a telephone call from Boal a few weeks (b)(7)(c) UBL operation. [redacted] said he told Boal to call (b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6) [redacted] said he first met Boal in person

(b)(7)(c) [redacted]

Regarding their overall relationship, [redacted] said he would not characterize Boal a personal friend.

38. (U//FOUO) [redacted] stated he did not recall inviting Boal to the ceremony, nor did he remember directing anyone to invite Boal. [redacted] said that the invitation to Boal was one of several recommendations that OPA [redacted] stated that he posed no objection to Boal's attendance, admitting that he did not consider Boal's presence with regard to the possible disclosure of classified information at the ceremony.

(b)(3)

CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

39. (U//FOUO) [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct [redacted] that during the ceremony, he remembered seeing Boal standing to the side (b)(6) [redacted] He recalled seeing Boal again after the ceremony at the front of the tent, mingling with dignitaries. [redacted] (b)(7)(c) [redacted] may have introduced Boal to some of the dignitaries; however, [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(7)(c)

40. (U//FOUO) [redacted]

[redacted] While [redacted] recognized Boal did not have a security clearance, he told OIG he did not have a problem with Boal attending. [redacted] [redacted] and that no one ever advised him that it would be problematic if Boal was in attendance.

(b)(3)

CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

OIG Case (b)(3) CIAAct

10

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U//FOUO) Question #3: What were the origins of the misclassification of F/DCIA Panetta's speech for the UBL Operation Awards Ceremony? (b)(1)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct 41. (S//NF) F/DCIA Panetta told OIG that he handwrote _____ (b)(3) NatSecAct
_____ in the margin of the written speech for the purpose of including it in his remarks. F/DCIA Panetta said that the purpose of the ceremony was to recognize and award all the participants in the operation. _____ F/DCIA Panetta told OIG that had he been aware of concerns _____ he would not have mentioned it. (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c) 42. (U//FOUO) _____ (b)(6)
_____ classified the speech as 'SECRET//NOFORN' due to CTC information included in the (b)(7)(c)
speech. _____ that speeches for audiences such as the one planned for the UBL Operation Awards Ceremony were typically classified due to the understanding that everyone in attendance had a clearance. _____ (b)(3) CIAAct that CTC offered to handle the coordination of the information for him. _____ (b)(7)(c) with both the recent UBL raid and F/DCIA Panetta departing CIA, it was an extremely busy time and he assumed CTC's classification was accurate. _____ the information in question did not appear to him to be anything that had not already been discussed in the media by government officials on numerous occasions since the UBL raid. Had the information been something new, (b)(3) CIAAct he would have taken steps to coordinate the information. Additionally, (b)(7)(c) said that OPA at the time did not require that speeches be coordinated with outside agencies. (b)(3) CIAAct

43. (U//FOUO) OIG's investigation identified correspondence from CTC to _____ providing him with the information for the speech. The correspondence noted that the information had not been formally coordinated with other components either inside or outside the Agency and offered to coordinate the information if needed. (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c) 44. (U//FOUO) _____ it was at the prerogative of the speechwriter _____ to coordinate the speech with the PAO's of other agencies. _____ said this coordination was not mandatory and at the discretion of the speechwriter or the Director's Office. _____ that either _____ or _____ would have been the persons to direct _____ to coordinate the speech with the appropriate entities. (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

OIG Case No. (b)(3) CIAAct

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**(U) Section VI – DOJ Coordination**

1. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ On 17 October 2012, the matter was referred to the Department of Justice (DOJ) as potential violations of Titles 18 U.S.C. Sections 793 (Gathering, transmitting or losing defense information) and 798 (Disclosure of classified information). DOJ declined prosecution on 5 September 2013 in favor of administrative action.

(U) Section VII – Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act Notice

2. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ The information in this report is covered by the Privacy Act, 5 USC §552a, and should be handled accordingly.

(b)(3) CIAAct

OIG Case No. (b)(3) CIAAct

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**(U) EXHIBITS OR ATTACHMENTS**

- A. Memorandum from DoD/OIG, undated, without attachments.
- B. OPA Press Release entitled "*CIA Director Panetta Hosts Bin Ladin Operation Recognition Ceremony*," undated.
- C. F/DCIA Panetta's briefing materials for the 1 May 2010, White House Correspondents' Association Dinner.
- D. Email from [] to [], dated 21 April 2011.
 - (b)(3) CIAAct
 - (b)(6)
 - (b)(7)(c)

OIG Case N(b)(3) CIAAct

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

OIG/INV/ (b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

Distribution:**Original – Addressee w/att****1 – cc: D/OS w/att****1 – IG Chrono w/o att****1 – INV Chrono w/o att****1 – INV Subject Fil(b)(3) CIAAct w/attch**

OIG Case (b)(3) CIAAct

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

EXHIBIT A

VICTIM'S

DDIG000001

TOP SECRET/

TOP SECRET/

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

NOF.

/NOFORN



(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22304-1800

**MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

SUBJECT: (U) Referral of Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified DoD Information

(U//FOUO) We are referring to you for appropriate action the unauthorized disclosures of DoD information by the former Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to a movie producer not authorized to receive the information.

(U) On June 24, 2011, the CIA held the Usama bin Laden (UBL) Operation Award Ceremony at CIA, hosted by the former Director. The attendees included a movie producer, CIA personnel, and DoD personnel, some of whom participated in the tracking and killing of UBL. All attendees were exposed to DoD classified information pertaining to sensitive programs and operations.

(U) We obtained a DVD of the ceremony marked SECRET//NOFORN as part of a data call in an ongoing project being conducted by my office, and transcribed the remarks by the former Director. (TAB A).

(U//FOUO) At our request, Original Classification Authorities with jurisdiction of the information reviewed the transcript and confirmed multiple remarks made by the former Director during the ceremony contained information classified TOP SECRET/ and TOP SECRET/ (TAB B and C). Further, remarks made during the introduction of the former Director and awards presentations at the conclusion of his remarks, which were not transcribed, appear to contain similar classified information. (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(U//FOUO) My point of contact for this matter is (b)(6), 703-882(b)(6)

James R. Ives
James R. Ives
Acting Deputy Inspector General
for Intelligence and Special
Program Assessments

Attachments:
As Stated

Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 20370911

TOP SECRET/ (b)(1) /NOFORN
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (b)(3) NatSecAct PARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS
TOP SECRET/ (b)(1) /NOFORN
(b)(3) NatSecAct

EXHIBIT B

VICTIM'S

CIA Director Panetta Hosts Bin Ladin Operation Recognition Ceremony

In a ceremony held last Friday at CIA Headquarters, Director Leon E. Panetta honored the dedication and commitment of CIA officers, military service members, and Intelligence Community partners for their work on the historic operation that concluded the hunt for Usama Bin Ladin.

"Thanks to men and women across our Agency and across our Community, we applied the full range of our capabilities – human intelligence, technical collection, the very best tradecraft – to this difficult operation," said Director Panetta. "Few events in recent history have carried the same impact, or been so widely acclaimed."

In his remarks, the Director stressed the importance of never giving up and of questioning assumptions in the pursuit of truth. He told those in attendance to always have a back-up plan and to never shy away from risk, noting that accepting risk is inherent to the intelligence business and part of the spirit that makes America great. He concluded by emphasizing that outstanding teamwork brought the operation to a successful conclusion, and that the ceremony was a celebration of a genuine team effort.

Director Panetta and Director of National Intelligence James Clapper presented commemorative plaques to the CIA, Intelligence Community, and military officers who contributed to the Bin Ladin intelligence case and operation.

Vice Admiral William McRaven accepted on behalf of the strike team that stormed the al-Qaeda leader's compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan.

"Few can say that they had a hand in an operation that made the world a better place," Director Panetta told the crowd of approximately 1,300 attendees. "Getting rid of Bin Ladin has made this nation and our world a safer place for our children."

CIA officers from across all directorates were honored. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Director Letitia Long and National Security Agency Director General Keith Alexander accepted plaques on behalf of their respective agencies – both of which played key roles in building the intelligence case for the raid. Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence Stephanie O'Sullivan accepted for the Open Source Center and the National Counterterrorism Center.

"To each of you who participated in this operation, you have my undying respect and my undying admiration," Director Panetta said. "Please know that I will carry this memory forever in my heart. And so will the American people."

EXHIBIT C

VICTIM'S

UNCLASSIFIED

White House Correspondents' Association Dinner
Washington Hilton Hotel
1919 Connecticut Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20009

1 May 2010

Sequence of Events

1900

D/CIA arrival at the Washington Hilton Hotel
Proceed to the ABC News reception in the L'Enfant Room
(Security POC: (b)(6))

1930

Guests proceed to dinner in the International Ballroom

2000

Dinner program begins


2300

Event concludes
D/CIA departs

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Jonathan Karl
(Provided by ABC News)



Jonathan Karl was named ABC News' Senior Congressional Correspondent in November 2008. In this role, he is responsible for covering Capitol Hill for all ABC News broadcasts and platforms including *World News*, *Nightline*, *Good Morning America*.

Mr. Karl joined ABC News in January 2003 as the network's Senior Foreign Affairs correspondent covering the State Department. In December 2005 he was named Senior National Security Correspondent. He has traveled the world for ABC News, reporting from more than two dozen countries on five continents.

In 2004, Mr. Karl spent several months on the campaign trail covering the Bush-Cheney campaign. He co-anchored election night coverage on ABC News Now, anchoring for more than 14 straight hours.

Mr. Karl previously served as a congressional correspondent for CNN. In his eight years with CNN, he covered Capitol Hill, the White House, and the Pentagon. While there, he reported on two presidential elections, President Clinton's impeachment, the NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia, and congressional reaction to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

In 2001, Mr. Karl won The National Press Foundation's Everett McKinley Dirksen Award, the highest honor for Congressional reporting.

During his time on Capitol Hill, Mr. Karl was the first to report on two of the most significant congressional stories in recent years: Senator Jim Jefford's decision to leave the Republican Party and Trent Lott's decision to step down as Senate Majority Leader. In 1998, Mr. Karl was the first reporter to obtain the Starr Report, one of the most sought after political documents in recent years.

Prior to joining CNN, Mr. Karl worked as an investigative reporter for *The New York Post*. He also worked as a researcher and reporter for *The New Republic*.

A prolific writer, his work has been published in *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Weekly Standard*, *The New Republic*, *Reason*, *Christian Science Monitor*, and *The San Francisco Chronicle*. In December 1995, Mr. Karl's non-fiction book, *The Right to Bear Arms: The Rise of America's New Militias*, was published by Harper-Collins.

He graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Vassar College in Poughkeepsie, NY, in 1990, where he was editor-in-chief of *The Vassar Spectator*.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Jay Leno
(From various internet sources)



Jay was born James Douglas Muir Leno, on April 28, 1950, in New Rochelle, New York (raised in Andover, MA), to Angelo Leno, an insurance salesman, and Cathryn Leno, a homemaker.

Leno made his first appearance on *The Tonight Show* in 1977, and was a regular on the variety show *The Marilyn McCoo and Billy Davis, Jr. Show*. In the mid-80s, Leno hosted his first comedy special on TV: *Jay Leno and the American Dream*. Around this same period, he made numerous successful appearances on late-night TV, particularly *Late Night* with David Letterman. Later that year he signed a deal with NBC that made him one of two permanent guest hosts of *The Tonight Show*. He became the only guest host two years later.

In 1992, Johnny Carson surprised many by retiring from his long-standing role as America's beloved and premier talk show host. There had been speculation that David Letterman, whose *Late Night* show followed Carson's, would take over hosting duties, a position he had publicly coveted. However, NBC picked the more clean-cut Leno, who most considered to be a safer, more middle-America-friendly choice.

Initially, the transfer of hosting duties to Leno did not go smoothly. There was a well-documented falling out between Leno and his long-time manager, Helen Kushnick, who had assumed executive-producing duties for the show. Kushnick was eventually fired, and the show gained momentum and a growing audience.

In 1993, his contract was extended five years, at \$40 million and, two years later, Leno won the Emmy for hosting *The Tonight Show*. In 1998, he renewed again for another five years, this time at \$100 million.

In 2003, Leno announced that he planned to leave NBC in 2010. Late night talk show host Conan O'Brien was soon named his heir. But in December of 2008, shortly before Leno's contract was set to expire, the network made a surprise announcement: in 2009, Leno would move to a new primetime slot at 10 PM on NBC. The new program, titled *The Jay Leno Show*, aired in September of 2009, but was cancelled in January 2010 amid controversy. Leno returned to host *The Tonight Show with Jay Leno* on March 1, 2010.

Leno has been married to wife Mavis Nicholson since 1980. They live in Los Angeles, where he spends his spare time working on his collection of classic cars and motorcycles.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

**White House Correspondents' Association Dinner
1 May 2010**

You accepted an invitation from Jonathan Karl, ABC News' Senior Congressional Correspondent, to attend the annual White House Correspondents' Association (WHCA) Dinner held at the Washington Hilton Hotel. Dress for the event is black tie.

Upon your arrival, the ABC News reception honoring White House Correspondent, Jake Tapper, will be underway in the L'Enfant Room. The reception concludes and the dining rooms open at 1930; the dinner program begins at 2000 in the International Ballroom. You will sit with your host, Jonathan Karl, along with other ABC News guests.

The full agenda for the evening is traditionally not disclosed. Dinner will be served at 2030, President Barack Obama will make remarks, and comedian Jay Leno will perform a standup routine. The program is expected to conclude at 2300.

The audience of approximately 3,000 guests, includes dozens of luminaries from the world of politics, business, media and entertainment. Media coverage will be high.

Background: The WHCA represents the White House press corps in its dealings with the administration on coverage-related issues. The annual dinner is a fund-raising event to raise money for journalism scholarships. This year 17 students from Washington, DC, will receive \$132,000 in college scholarships from the WHCA. Of note, for the first time in its 96-year history the association is reducing the carbon impact of the gala by employing multiple eco-friendly measures.

Attachments:

Sequence of Events
Jonathan Karl bio
Jay Leno bio
Dinner Seating

POC: [REDACTED] (b)(3) CIAAct

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Dinner Seating
(Provided by ABC News)

Christiane Amanpour, Anchor, ABC News

Evan Bayh, US Senator (D-IN)

Kathryn Bigelow, Director, "The Hurt Locker"

Mark Boal, Screenwriter, Producer, "The Hurt Locker"

Ian Cameron, Executive Producer, "This Week," ABC News

Jonathan Karl, Senior Congressional Correspondent, ABC News

Maria Karl, spouse of Jonathan Karl

Leon Panetta, Director, Central Intelligence Agency

Martha Raddatz, Senior Foreign Affairs Correspondent, ABC News

Jamie Rubin, Adjunct Professor, Columbia University, School of International & Public Affairs

UNCLASSIFIED

EXHIBIT D

VICTIM NEWS

UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(3) CIAAct
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To (b)(3) CIAAct

cc

bcc

04/21/2011 05:40 PM

Subject [AIN] Call from Mark Boal

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

Please respond to

[**** Document has been archived. Click "Retrieve" button to retrieve document contents and attachments. ****]

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Mark Boal, the screenwriter from The Hurt Locker, called for you.

Said he had dinner with DCIA about a year ago and DCIA said to let you know if Boal was ever going to Afghanistan.

He's going in about a week and is calling in as DCIA asked.

(b)(6)

(b)(3) CIAAct

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